Urhobo Historical Society

Subject:         "Military Coup of 15th January 1966" (Part 2)
   Date:         Tue, 25 Jun 2002 12:24:57 EDT
   From:         Nigeria2Day@aol.com
     To:         undisclosed-recipients:;

Leaked [Police] Special Branch Report:
"Military Rebellion of 15th January 1966"
Part III

By Nowamagbe Omoigui, MD, MPH, FACC

This is the Police Report on the official investigation into the coup of 15 January 1966. It was prepared by Police Special Branch Interrogators based on interviews with soldiers, other ranks and some officers who had been arrested after the mutiny.

None of the soldiers and officers involved had come to formal trial in a court-martial as of the time of the July 29 1966 "counter-coup". Indeed the fact they were not court-martialed was one of the grievances listed by those officers who carried out the unfortunate operations of July 28-August 1, 1966.

The coup report was released to very few individuals in Nigeria and certain foreign governments in early August 1966 - and then leaked. The remainder of the report which allegedly implicated certain other persons has apparently never been released widely to this day. It exists, we are on its trail - and shall publish it on sight.



121. Major C.K. Nzeogwu of the Nigerian Military Training College (NMTC) at Kaduna was appointed by the "inner circle" as the commander of the rebellion in the North. The manner in which this was to be organised appears to have been left entirely to him.

122. The record does not show that any officers, other than Major Nzeogwu, in the North were taken into the confidence of the inner circle. It is, however, probable that some time before the rebellion Major Nzeogwu obtained the co-operation of Major T. Onwatuegwu and Captain G. Ude, both of the NMTC.

123. Whereas in the West and in the Lagos area military movements by night were not unusual as a result of the disturbed conditions then prevailing, this was not the case at Kaduna. It was, therefore, necessary that a cover be provided for the proposed rebellious activities, at the same time creating a reason for bringing troops out of barracks by night without alerting the senior officers of 1 Brigade to Nzeogwu's intentions.

124. It has been established that Military night exercises in the Kaduna area, organized by the NMTC, then under the command of Major Nzeogwu commenced in early December 65, leading up to Exercise Damissa on 13 and 14 Jan. 66. By then the population of Kaduna and the Police were accustomed to troop movements after dark.

125. The master plan of the inner circle made provision for the arrest of a number of leading political personalities who were not to be killed unless they offered resistance. This may well have been true as far as the West, Mid-West and the East were concerned. In view of Major Nzeogwu's activities at the Premier's Lodge in Kaduna, however, it is thought that this officer had no intention of abiding by these decisions but was determined, from the start, to kill the Premier of the North at any cost.


126. The details of exercise DAMISSA are not relevant to this report. Suffice it to say that the night exercise of 13 Jan 66 took place in the area of the Ministers' quarters in Kaduna, whereas that of 14 Jan 66 was held in the bush some 5 or 6 miles outside Kaduna along the Zaria road.

Units involved

l27. On 14 Jan 66 troops from the following units took part in Exercise DAMISSA:

(1) 3rd Battalion NA -"C" Company

(2) N.M.T.C.

(3) No. 1 Field Squadron NAE

(4) No.2 Field Squadron NAE

(5) 1 Brigade Transport Company NASC

(6) lst Field Battery NAA

Arms and Ammunition

128. Troops proceeding on military training exercises by night or by day were normally issued with their arms, either without ammunition or with blanks.

129. As far as can be established, this practice was first deviated from on Jan 13 66 when, at approximately 0900 hours Major Nzeogwu handed the Acting RQMS of the NMTC, Ssgt. J. Daramola, a list of live ammunition required for Exercise DAMISSA.   This NCO handed the list to Cpl. E. Aiyikere, the arms storeman, with instructions to draw this ammunition from the NMTC Magazine at Kawo. This was done and the ammunition was issued in bulk at approximately 1730 hours on 14 Jan 66 by Ssgt. Daramola and CMS Oko (also of NMTC).

130. This list of ammunition issued is not available but it has, however, been established that at least 6 x 84 mm projectiles for the Carl Gustav Anti-Tank gun were issued to Sgt. Yakubu Adebiyi, an instructor in the Tactical Wing of the NMTC. These were loaded into a landrover whilst the bulk of the small Arms Ammunition drawn was loaded into a 3-Tonner driven by NA/ 18266054 Pte. Clement Agbe of 1 Bde. Transport Coy. This driver subsequently transported the ammunition to the DAMISSA exercise area.


131. Exercise DAMISSA terminated at approximately 0130 hours on 15 Jan 66. Around that time all officers engaged in the exercise with the exception of the officers of 1st Field Battery NAA, were called by Major Nzeogwu to attend an "O" Group in the bush at which, they believed, the success or otherwise of the exercise was to be discussed. Identified as present at this discussion are the following:

(1) Major C.K. Nzeogwu       )NMTC

(2) Major T. Onwatuegwu  )NMTC

(3) Captain G. Ude ) NMTC

(4) 2/Lt. S. R. Omeruah      )3rd Bn NA - "C" Coy

(5) 2/Lt. D.K. Waribor       )

(6) Capt. B. Gbulie          )at the time in command of lst and 2nd Field Squadron NAE

(7) 2/Lt. Ileabachi          )

(8) 2/Lt. Kpera              ) lst Field Sqn NAE

(9) 2/Lt. P. Ogoegbunam Ibik   )

(10) Lieut. E. Okafor        )

(11) 2/Lt. Ezedima           ) 2nd Field Sqn NAE

(12) 2/Lt. H.O.D. EGHAGHA     )

132. The officers of 1st Field Battery NAA were not called to the "O" Group for reasons which are not altogether clear. No direct use in connection with the rebellion was made of this Battery that night.

133. When all the officers were assembled, Major Nzeogwu addressed then on the subject of the rapidly deteriorating political and security situation in the Federation. He claimed that a stage had been reached at which the politicians should be told to quit. To accomplish this, he announced, the army had decided to take over power by force of arms.

He compared the incomes of the politicians with those of Nigerian workers and urged the officers to support the rebellion. He further announced that the revolt was taking place simultaneously in all regional capitals and at Lagos and that, therefore, they need fear no repercussions as a result of the activities in which they were about to participate that night. It would appear that none of these present raised a dissenting voice. In fact, their subsequent actions showed, in most cases, enthusiastic support for the plan.

134. Major Nzeogwu then proceeded to issue set tasks to each officer present. Events have shown that, subsequently, last minute changes in these plans were made. The tasks allotted have been established as follows:

Occupation of Vulnerable Points

135. The officer in over-all charge of this part of the operation was Capt. B. Gbulie. He claimed to have distributed tasks as shown below on the spur of the moment:

(1) Ammunition Service Depot (ASD) -2/Lt. Ileabachi

(2) P & T Telephone Exchange       -2/Lt. P. Ogoegbunam Ibik

(3) N.B.C. House                   -2/Lt. Kpera

(4) BCNN Radio & TV Station        -2/Lt. Ezedima

(5) State House                    -2/Lt. Okafor

(6) Road Blocks on Kachia Road near PMF Barracks -2/Lt. Eghagha

136. In addition, Capt. Gbulie was instructed to rouse the following officers to inform them of what was taking place and to ask for support:

(1) Capt. P. Anakwe - 1 Bde Staff Capt. "A"

(2) Major A.A. Keshi - Brigade Major

(3) Capt. L. Dillibe - 1 Bde Staff Capt. "Q"

(4) Lieut. J.C. Ojukwu - 1 Recce Squadron NA

(5) Lieut. Ikeachor

(6} Lieut. Mohammed Eandiya

Capt. Gbulie    has stated under interrogation that he complied with this order and caused these officers to foregather at HQ 1 Bde where he informed them of the situation.

137. As far as has been established, the following officers were then detailed for tasks as shown:

(1) Assassination of Alh Sir Ahmadu Bello

Major C.K. Nzeogwu

2/Lt. K.D. Waribor

2/Lt. S.E. Omeruah

Capt. G. Ude

(2) Assassination of Brigadier S. Ademulegun

Major T. Onwatuegwu

(3) Assassination of Colonel R.A. Shodeinde

2/Lt. K.D. Waribor

(4) Abduction of Sir Kashim Ibrahim

Major T. Onwatuegwu

(5)  Abduction of Makaman Bida - Regional Finance Minister

Major C.K. Nzeogwu

138. After the officers had been briefed they were sent to join their men and to proceed immediately with the execution of the tasks allotted to them. It is not clear whether or not Major Nzeogwu instructed the officers to inform their men of what was afoot. It is certain that the men of 3rd Battalion who were to be used for the attack of the Premier's Lodge were not briefed. It is equally certain that Capt. Gbulie addressed all the men of the Engineers under his command and spoke to them along the lines in which Major Nzeogwu had briefed the officers.

139. Immediately after the "O" Group, senior NCOs of all units represented were sent to the 3~Tonner containing the ammunition and order to draw ammunition for their men. In the case of the "C" company this raised a problem. The men believed the exercise to be finished and a number of them queried the reason why they should be issued with live ammunition. This was explained to them by 2/Lt. Waribor who told them that they were proceeding on Internal Security Operations.

140. After the issue of ammunition had been completed, the entire force left the exercise area and proceeded to its allotted targets.

141. The following officers and ORs have been identified as having been involved in the attack on the Premier's Lodge:


(1) Major C .K. Nzeogwu - NMTC

(2) 2/Lt. K.D. Waribor - "C" Coy, 3rd BN NA

(3) 2/Lt. S.E. Omeruah - "

(4) Capt. G. Ude

Other ranks

(1) NA 18147406 Sgt. Husa Kanga - NMTC

(2) NA l8149900  Sgt Yakubu Adebiyi  - NMTC

(3) Sgt Duromola Oyegoke . NMTC

(4) NA 5888 Pte. Ogbole Agwu - 3rd Bn NA

(5) NA 2405 Pte Bello Mbulla  - 3rd Bn NA

(6) NA 18151763 L/Cpl . Samuel Amajo - 3rd Bn NA

(7) NA 18151319 L/Cpl  Danyo Mbulla - 3rd Bn NA

(8) NA 5684     Pte. Abu Odiedier - 3rd Bn NA

(9) NA 18148998 Pte  Lekoja Gidan-Jibrin - 3rd Bn NA

(10) NA 163287   Cp1. Bako Lamundo   - 3rd Bn NA

(11) NA 5860 Pte. Joseph Wadu Goji -3rd Bn NA

(12) NA 1982 Pte. Alexander Agbe - 3rd Bn NA

(13) NA 18151864 Pte Lagwin Goshit - 3rd Bn NA

(14) NA 18266006 Pte Augustine Oguche Agbo - 3rd Bn NA

(15) NA 634212   Pte Effiong Atkinson - 3rd Bn NA

(16) NA 18147284 Cpl. Tunana Bangir - 3rd Bn NA

(17) NA 18l49368 Cpl. Abibo Elf - 3rd Bn NA

(18) NA 18151873 Pte. Uguman Monogi - 3rd Bn NA

(19) NA 1562 Pte Felako Kwa - 3rd Bn NA

(20) NA 18149363 Cpl. Reuben Nwagwugwu - 3rd Bn NA

(20) NA 502542 Cpl. Yakubu Kaje - 3rd Bn NA

(21) NA 505092 L/Cpl. Mamis Hundu - 3rd Bn NA

(22) NA 18151861 L/Cpl Thaddens Thamyil Tsenyi1 - 3rd Bn NA

(23) NA l8148269 L/Cpl Issna1m Tayapa - 3rd Bn NA

(24) NA 18148272 L/Cpl Ali Shendam - 3rd Bn NA

(25) NA 18151771 Pte. Usuman Gabure - 3rd Bn NA

(26) NA 18149613 Pte Emmanue1 Ekwueme - 3rd Bn NA

(27) NA 4887 Pte Erastus Nakito - 3rd Bn NA

(29) NA 3659 Pte Jonathan Anahiri - 3rd Bn NA

142. When this force left the DAMISSA exercise area, it was led by Major Nzeogwu who was travelling in a landrover accompanied by a driver and two OR's. He was followed by another landrover containing Sgts. Adebiyi, Manga and Oyegoke who were armed with two 84mm Carl Gustav Anti-Tank Guns and 6 projectiles.

143. Following this were a number of other vehicles, landrovers and 3-Tonner containing 2/Lts. Waribor and Omeruah and troops from "C" Coy 3rd BN NA.

144. On arrival at the main gate to the compound, Major Nzeogwu found 4 PCs on guard in front of the gate. They were the following:

(1) No.8301 L/Cpl. Musa Nimzo

(2) No. 10674 PC. Akpan Anduka

(3) No. 18913 PC Hagai Lai

(4)     No. 18920 PC Peter Attah

145. Major Nzeogwu, who was armed with a sterling SMG, ordered the constables to face the wall. Attah complied with this order but the three others refused. Without further ado, Major Nzeogwu immediately opened fire on them with his SMG killing all three on the spot.

146. Immediately after the killing of the policemen, Major Nzeogwu ordered the two men with the guns and the 3 NMTC Sergeants to follow him into the compound, bringing with them the Carl Gustav guns and the projectiles for these weapons.

147. Immediately inside the compound, Major Nzeogwu stationed the Carl Gustavs some 10 yards apart facing the lodge. The gunners were Sgts. Oyegeke and Manga, whilst Sgt. Adebiyi acted as ammunition number. As soon as both guns had been loaded, Major Nzeogwu ordered the NCOs to open fire at the Lodge. Both fired their projectiles bursting inside the ground floor rooms of the building. Sgt. Adebiyi stated that he then ran towards Sgt. Manga to help this NCO reload.

Whilst he was with Manga he heard Major Nzeogwu shouting repeatedly "Fire you bastard, fire". Immediately after this both Manga and Adebiyi heard a burst of SMG fire. They turned round and observed Sgt. Oyegoke slumped on the ground bleeding from multiple wounds. It was clear to both that their colleague had been killed by Major Nzeogwu either for refusing to obey or because he attempted to run away.

143. After the killing of Oyegeke, Major Nzeogwu ordered Sgt. Adebiyi to take over Oyegeke's gun and to continue firing at the house. Both Adebiyi and Manga, frightened by Oyegoke's killing, continued to fire as ordered. They used a total of 5 projectiles. As a result the building caught fire.

149. Whilst all this was happening, 2/Lst. Waribor and Omeruah had arrived with the men from 3rd BN who were rapidly deployed around the outer perimeter wall of the lodge. Although these men heard the bursting of the Carl Gustav projectiles, the SMG and SLR fire and the screaming of women and children inside the compound, they were in no position to observe what was happening.

150. 2/Lt. Waribor, whilst deploying his men, instructed them to shoot anyone they observed attempting to leave the compound. A number of civilians, including women, however, were seen running and crying and Major Nzeogwu firing at them with his SMG.

151. NA 502342 Cpl. Yakubu Kaje of 3rd BN NA reports that, at a given moment, he observed a civilian coming out of the Lodge armed with a sword. The corporal and the men with him stopped the civilian and ordered him to drop the sword. At this moment, according to the corporal, Major Nzeogwu arrived on the scene and asked the civilian, in Hausa, for the whereabouts of the "master of the house". The man replied that he did not know, whereupon Major Nzeogwu threatened to kill him unless he led him to his master. The man then agreed and led Major Nzeogwu to the back of the building. A shortwhile afterwards, the corporal states, he heard a number of shots fired. Assuming that Kaje is telling the truth, it is probable that the Sardauna of Sokoto died at that moment.

152. Cpl. Kaje has further reported that when the firing ceased, Major Nzeogwu came from the compound and was met at the gate by 2/Lt. Waribor, who asked the Major: "Did you get the man?", to which Nzeogwu answered, "Yes". When Major Nzeogwu left the compound he stated for all to hear, exultantly, "I have been successful, he is dead".

153. It has not been possible to establish the circumstances in which the senior wife of the deceased Premier was killed. The same applies to the death of one Zaruni, the Premier's personal body-guard. It is presumed that they died at the same time as the Premier.

154. With regards to the killing of Ahmed Ben Musa, Senior Assistant Secretary (Security) in front of the Lodge, none of the men interrogated has admitted to having witnessed this. Ahmed Ben Musa was shot dead in his car by a number of unidentified soldiers, having arrived at the Premier's Lodge after being alerted by the police. Presumably the soldiers had ordered Musa to drive away but he could not do so for some unexplained reason. They then killed him.


155. The following have been identified as having been involved in the killing of this senior officer and his wife at No.1, Kashim Ibrahim Road, Kaduna at approximately 0200 hours on 15 January 1966:-

(1) Major Timothy Onwatuegwu (NMTC)

(2) NA 18265005 Spr. Yakubu Dungo 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(3) NA 18266079 L/Cpl . Lawrence Akuma 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(4)    Spr. Raphael O1atunde 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(5) James Aluta 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(6) Emmanuel Udo 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(7) Simon Agi 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(8) Felix 0. {Snu) 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE {now NMTC)

(9) L/Cpl . Mu1i {Snu) 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE {now NMTC)

(10) NMT Cp1. Yakubu Bako 1 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(11) Spr. Mathew Asanya  1 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(12) Joseph Odion   1 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(13) Spr. Henry Va1ia 1 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(14) NA 18149929 Pte. Geofrey Eborendu 1 Bde. Tpt Coy NASC

156. After the briefing at the DAMISSA "O" Group by Major Nzeogwu at 0130 hours l5 Jan 66, Major Onwatuegwu entered a landrover driven by No. NA 18149929 Pte. G. Eberandu of Bde. Tpt. Coy. With the exception of L/Cpl. Lawrence Akuma all the men mentioned were made to enter this vehicle and another landrover.

157. Before leaving the exercise area these men drew ammunition from the 3-Tonner already referred to in this report. They had already been briefed as what was expected from them that night by Capt. Gbulie, the OC. The two vehicles then moved off to the junction of the Lagos Zaria roads where they stopped. Here the men from one of the landrovers were transferred to a 3-Tonner whilst the empty landrover containing only the driver and L/Cpl. Muli was despatched to the Air Force Base by Major Onwatuegwu.

158. When L/Cpl. Muli returned, the convoy, now consisting of 2 landrovers and one 3-Tonner, proceeded to the residence of Brigadier Ademulegun. At some distance from the house, variously estimated at between 100 and 400 yards, all three vehicles stopped. Major Onwatuegwu ordered a section of men under L/Cpl. Muli to accompany him towards the house.

159. The Brigadier's house was guarded by L/Cpl. Lawrence Akuma and three sappers of 2 Field Squadron NAE. When the Major and his party arrived, L/Cpl. Akuma and the two sappers were on the verandah of the house whilst one sapper was patrolling the grounds. The latter challenged Major Onwatuegwu when he approached. He was disarmed and escorted to the house where he was made to join the guard commander and the other two members of the guard. They were all placed in the custody of a number of soldiers.

160. Major Onwatuegwu, accompanied by a number of soldiers entered the house. A short while after this, the guard heard several shots fired upstairs after which the Major and his men returned. The guard were placed into the 3-Tonner truck and driven to HQ 1 Brigade where they remained until released in the morning.


161. The only persons positively identified as having been involved in the murder of this senior officer are the following:-

(l) Major C.K. Nzeogwu - NMTC

(2) Major T. Onwatuegwu - NMTC

(3) Lieut. G.E. Nwokedi - NMTC

162. It will be recalled that at the briefing by Major Nzeogwu, it was 2/Lt. Waribor who was allotted the task of killing the Colonel, after the attack on the Premier's Lodge 2/Lt. Waribor has stated that after the completion of his task at the Premier's Lodge, he was ordered by Major Nzeogwu to effect the arrest of Makaman Bida before proceeding to Col. Shodeinde's residence. He was unable to do so, because he did not know the address of the Colonel, and therefore, returned to Brigade Headquarters.

163. Mrs. Shodeinde has stated that at approximately 0300 hours on Jan 15. 66 she heard the sound of three vehicles stopping in front of her house. Immediately afterwards she heard a voice which she identified as that of Major Nzeogwu, calling her husband's name. The Colonel was fast asleep. She left her bed and switched on the lights. As she did so, the men outside started to shoot at the doors and windows of the house and she was immediately wounded in the left hand. The door then flew open and about ten soldiers rushed into the room. Amongst these she identified Major Nzeogwu, Major Onwatuegwu and Lieut. Nwokedi.

164. By this time the Colonel was awake and sitting up in bed. Mrs. Shodeinde started to cry and beg for her life. Nzeogwu assured her that they had not come to kill her but her husband the Colonel. When she continued shouting, the other soldiers shot at her legs, wounding her several times.

165. Major Nzeogwu and the others then commenced firing at the Colonel whilst still in bed, who fell down dead or dying by the side of the bed. Mrs. Shodeinde then fled from the room and ran for shelter to the servant's quarters where she remained until the attackers left.


166. This abduction was accomplished by the persons involved in the assassination of Brigadier S. Ademulegun. Their names are, therefore, not repeated here.

167. After killing the Brigadier, Major Onwatuegwu ordered his men to re-enter their vehicles and drove straight to the Governor's residence. On arrival a number of men were deployed around the house whilst the Major entered accompanied by a number of unidentified soldiers.

168. The house was then being guarded by the following police constables:-

(1) No.11258 PC Benson Sihindatiya

(2) No.185   "  Yohana Garkawa

(3) No.1391  "  Johnson Lamurde

(4) No.18909 "  Warzar

169. At approximately 0245 hours Major Onwatuegwu and his party reached the residence, according to PC Lamurde. The Major was then in the landrover. The first landrover containing some 7 men stopped. The man jumped out and overpowered the PC on duty. The Major then entered the building.

170. Whilst the Major and his party were inside, the military personnel who remained outside the building heard a burst of SMG fire. It is certain that this burst of SMG fire killed PC Yohana Garkawa. PC Sihindatiya was disarmed by 4 soldiers and dragged to the police guard room where he saw the dead body of PC Garkawa. The soldiers pointed at the body and said "Do you see your brother?". They then instructed him to lead them to the bedroom of the Governor. When he stated that he did not know where the Governor was sleeping they threatened to kill him. By that time, however, the Governor had been found by other soldiers reaching the residence. He was brought out and made to enter the 3-Tonner and was driven to HQ 1 Brigade.

171. Simultaneously with the Governor, his two ADC's Messrs. Noman Dikwa and Garba Lango, were abducted and driven to 1 Bde HQ in the landrover containing Major Onwatuegwu.


172. This attempted abduction (or assassination) failed because the Minister was not in his house that night, having traveled to Bida, his home town, the previous day. The incident is, however, worth reporting, because during the search of the Minister's residence one man, Ahmadu Pategi, a Government driver, was killed by Lieut. Waribor who mistook him for the Minister.

173. Among those taking an active part in this incident the following have been identified:-

(1) 2/Lt. Waribor - NMTC (other names are illegible)

174. After the completion of the operation at the Premier's Lodge, 2/Lt. Waribor met Major Nzeogwu near the main entrance to the Lodqe. The Major had been wounded during the attack and had bloodstains on the right side of his face and his shirt. The Major ordered Waribor to take his platoon to the house of Makaman Bida, to arrest the Minister and to take him to Brigade Headquarters.

175. Waribor complied with the order, and drove straight to the Minister's house. On arrival he deployed his men around the house and called in a loud voice upon the Minister to surrender. This brought no reaction so he forced open the door with the intention of searching the house. At this moment Major Nzeogwu arrived. The Major ordered Waribor to search the ground floor whilst he, accompanied by a number of men from 3rd Brigade NA went upstairs.

176. Waribor's search downstairs proved fruitless. He collected about 3 house servants and questioned them as to the whereabouts of their master. They claimed that the Minister had traveled to Bida and was returning in the morning. Whilst he was questioning the servants outside the house, Waribor observed a man running from the house with his face covered.

Believing this to be the Minister, Waribor fired at the man and killed him. He then went to the body, and after removing the cloth from the man's face, found that he was mistaken. It was later established that the body was that of Ahmadu Pategi, a Government driver attached to the Minister.

177. Major Nzeogwu, having failed to find the Minister upstairs then came down and enquired from Waribor why he had fired his SMG. Waribor explained after which Nzeogwu ordered him to accompany him to the house of Colonel Shodeinde, who according to the plan was to be killed that night. The Major then drove off before Waribor had a chance to assemble his men and to mount into the vehicles. Since Waribor did not know Col. Shodeinde's address and the Major had departed without him, he had no choice but to return to Brigade Headquarters.


178. This was carried out by the officers named in paragraph 135 of this report without producing any incident of interest to this enquiry. 2/Lt. H.O.D. Eghagha whose task it was to set up a road block on the Kachia Road near the Police Mobile Force Barracks was instructed to prevent the PMF from travelling into Kaduna. This, it is thought, implied that he and his men were to attack the PMF should they move out in strength. It has been established, however, that 2/Lt.

Eghagha instructed his men not to molest the PMF as these were too few in number to affect materially the rebellious operations of that night. It is a fact that the majority of the Northern PMF were, at that time, serving in Western Nigeria.


179. Although not directly involved in any of the incidents reported on in this document, there is no doubt that the Nigerian Air Force played a comparatively important role in the rebellion under the command of 2/Lt. Godfrey Ikechukwu Amuchienwa of the Military Training and Security Squadron NAF at Kaduna.

NOTE: At this point the (incomplete) report ends.

SPELLINGS: Please excuse some of the spelling errors. The original documents from which these were culled had a few areas that were not very legible