| Urhobo
Historical
Society |
Military Rule and
Damage to the Spirit of the Nigerian Constitution
Peter Ekeh
State
University of New York at
Buffalo
Peter Ekeh at the Lagos Lecture, December 1, 2010
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A
lecture delivered at
a forum organized by Lagos State, Nigeria, at Eko
City Hall, December 1, 2010. I thank His Excellency Babatunde Fashola,
Governor
of Lagos State of Nigeria, for his kind invitation to me to address
this
gathering of Chiefs and grassroots of Lagos State as well as a good
sampling of
interested Nigerian intelligentsia. I am grateful to Professor Adebayo
Williams, Adviser to the Governor of Lagos State on International
Affairs, for
making the invitation to me possible. I acknowledge, with thanks, help
from Dr. Isaac James Mowoe in the revision of an earlier draft of this
paper.
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Most
modern
nations
have
fundamental
documents
which
are
especially designated as Constitutions that define
the
scope and limits of the powers of organs of government which run their
affairs.
Constitutions provide boundaries and contexts for legislative acts of
national
and sub-national parliaments and they circumscribe judicial
interpretation of legal
enactments by legislative assemblies. In Nigerian political history,
there has
been an abundance of these constitutional documents, stretching from
colonial
times to the current version of the 1999 Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Well
beyond
such
written
constructions,
modern
nations
also
take into account their constitutional histories
and
practices, which may predate their prevailing Constitutions. Such histories and practices capture legal and
constitutional sentiments and attitudes that reflect the collective
wisdom of
the people whom written Constitutions are deemed to serve. I will refer
to such
bundle of folk practices, sentiments and attitudes towards the
governing
principles that the people embrace as the spirit of the nation’s
constitution.
Ultimately, any nation’s written constitution derives its underlying
authority
and legitimacy from its compliance with the Spirit of the Constitution
which
informs the people’s respect for governance. National constitutions
that
disrespect the constitutional history and practices of the people are
therefore
inherently defective.
The
distinction
between
a
nation’s
prevailing
Constitution
and
the Spirit of its Constitution may appear
contrived
in certain historic instances in which written constitutions have
longevity and
are fully reflective of the constitutional thought of such nations.
However, in
many other instances in which written constitutions have chaotic
history, the
distinction between prevailing Constitutional documents and the Spirit
of the
Constitution is an intellectual imperative. Consider the case of
Nigeria. For two
prolonged periods under military rule, Nigeria’s written Constitutions
were
suspended by its military dictators. Although the written Constitutions
of the
nation were thus rendered moot by those who forcibly seized power, the
spirit
of the Nigerian Constitution could not be decreed out of existence by
any
ruler’s fiat because it endures as an integral element of the political
culture
of the nation.
The
elementary
framework
for
Nigeria’s
constitutional
practices
was
constructed during colonial times. By the
date of
Nigeria’s national independence from colonial rule in October 1960, the
outline
of Nigeria’s constitutional thought and practices had become clear. In
particular, in the decolonization decade of the 1950s, beginning with
the
Ibadan Conference of 1950, Nigerians were fully immersed in the
business of
constructing a constitution by which their challenging cultural
diversities
could be ruled together as one nation. Although the violent overthrow
of
constitutional government in 1966 and the subsequent onrush and
upheaval of
civil war and military rule halted further elaboration of Nigeria’s
constitutional pathways, the constitutional framework that emerged from
the
negotiations of the decolonization decade of the 1950s seemed to have
embodied rather
fully the spirit of Nigerian political thought.
Despite
its
suspension
of
the
country’s
1963
Republican
Constitution, military rule in Nigeria
initially respected
the spirit of the Nigerian Constitution. Indeed, throughout the era of
the
civil war and while General Yakubu Gowon presided over the Central
Government,
Nigeria’s political affairs were ruled by a healthy respect for the
central tenets
of the spirit of the Nigerian constitution that was inherited from the
civilian
era of governance before the onset of military rule. A major departure
from
such implicit adherence to the spirit of the Nigerian Constitution
began with the
military putsch of 1975 led by General Murtala Muhammed and General
Olusegun
Obasanjo. Their military regime imposed a new constitutional framework
that
sharply revised the doctrine of Nigeria’s Independence Constitution. It
is that
new framework, introduced by an ideologically impassioned military
regime from
1975 onwards, which has taken hold in post-military Nigeria. The
current 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, decreed into being on May 5 1999 by General Abdulsalami
Abubakar
and his exclusively military Provisional Ruling Council, is ultimately
a
product of that newer constitutional framework. In many ways, both in
terms of
the structure and the culture of the Constitution, the existing
constitutional
framework and its rendition in the 1999 Constitution contrast sharply
with the
older principles of constitutionalism that
we inherited from the colonial era and
its immediate aftermath.
In
order
to
assess
the
attributes
of
the
existing 1999 Constitution and in order to reach any conclusions
about its strength
or weaknesses, it seems proper to compare and contrast these two
constitutional
frameworks that have dominated Nigeria’s Constitutional history. That
exercise
should enable us in some way to measure how much the 1960-63
Constitution and
the military-inspired 1999 Constitution comply or deviate from the
spirit of
the Nigerian Constitution as it emerged in our political culture
following
independence from colonial rule. Foremost in such comparison is an
assessment
of the environment that enabled these different constitutional
frameworks as
well as an appraisal of the factors that drove their construction.
The
Independence
Constitution
of
1960
(along
with
its
slightly revised 1963 version) was the product of sheer
necessity
borne out of attempts to reach difficult compromises among competing
regional interests.
The Willink Commission of 1957 was set up to probe the fears of
minorities
about their political fate in independent Nigeria in regions dominated
by the
Fulani aristocracy in the Northern Region, by the Igbo in the East and
by the
Yoruba in the West. Its publication in 1958 revealed just how
contentious the
negotiations for a formula for a constitutional federalism had become.
The
result of the negotiations of the protracted constitutional conferences
of the
pre-independence era was a homegrown form of federalism that protected
regional
interests, resulting in a central government with limited and
circumscribed
powers. The Independence Constitution was not ideologically driven nor
was it
fashioned from any templates copied from other people’s experiences. On
the
contrary, it was grounded in the practical experiences of Nigerian
history and
the preferences of Nigerians to ensure that their teeming ethnic
nationalities should
co-exist in a common political space in full anticipation of mutual
benefits
for all, while avoiding enforced uniformities.
In sharp contrast,
the various exercises to
construct a perfect constitution for Nigeria under military rule were
driven by
a singular ideology and mania of centralization of governmental
structures.
These constructions of a perfect constitution did mock the spirit of
the
Nigerian Constitution from the Independence era by incorporating the
term
“Federal” in the title of the Constitutional documents that were
produced by
commissioned bodies, including especially the Political Bureau under
General
Ibrahim Babangida’s regime. In other words, there was a marked
departure in
these military Constitutions from the pathways of federalism. They
decidedly
veered instead in the direction of full and unhindered centralization
of
powers. In one important sense, the Constitutional documents
manufactured from
military rule -- in 1979 under General Olusegun Obasanjo, in 1988 under
General
Ibrahim Babangida, in 1995 under General Sani Abacha, and in 1999 under
General
Abdulsalami Abubakar -- could be deemed to be the ratification of
measures of
centralization that military dictators had undertaken with little or no
consent
from vested civilian interests. Moreover, the 1999 Constitution appears
to be a
mandate from military dictators to their civilian followers in the
Nigerian
populace that they should continue with centralization of governmental
functions as the only way forward in the governance of Nigeria. Therein
lies the challenges in the 1999 Constitution
that finally
emerged from decades of military dictatorship in Nigeria.
My key argument
here, therefore, is that the
centralization mantra of the military constitutions was radically
different
from the federalism that was crafted in the Constitutions of 1960 and
1963,
before the downfall of constitutional governance. Permit me to anchor
that
point of view on two prime examples of the scope of the Constitution
and the
creation of constituent states of the Nigerian Federation. The Nigerian
Independence Constitution of 1960 (as well its revised Republican
Constitution
of 1963) was made up of four constitutional statements: (a)
Constitution of the
Nigerian Federation; (b) Constitution of Northern Nigeria; (c)
Constitution of
Western Nigeria; and (d) Constitution of Eastern Nigeria. Subsequently,
the
Constitution of Midwestern Nigeria was added to these when that Region
was
created in 1964. That is to say, each of the federating regions of the
Nigerian
federation stated in written constitutional documents its unique
preferences in
the form of governance best suited to its needs and traditions --
provided these
preferences did not violate the tenets of the common federal
constitution. For
instance, at an early stage of its constitutional development, Eastern
Nigeria
chose to be governed by a unicameral House of Assembly, whereas each of
the
North and the West had a House of Chiefs in addition to a House of
Assembly.
There were similar unique choices in the areas of bureaucracy,
education, and
agricultural development that each of the Regions made in their
constitutional
affairs.
All such nuanced
preferences and uniqueness
have been swept away by the centralized mandate of the 1999
Constitution. It
has no room for separate constitutional choices. All the States can
only have the
single choice of the dictated House of Assembly decreed by Article 90
of the
1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria: “There shall be a House
of Assembly for each of the States of the Federation.” One could
imagine
that if the choices were available, some states of the Federation might
opt to
have second legislative chambers, probably named House of Chiefs or
State Senate.
Others, perhaps for financial reasons, might be satisfied with
unicameral
legislative assemblies. This stricture of the 1999 Constitution should
not be
dismissed as a slight disadvantage. To resort to a bit of pre-colonial
history:
up to the point of outbreak of civil war in old Oyo in the late
eighteenth
century, Oyo kingdom had two legislative assemblies, Oyo Mesi and Ogboni, which served the realm quite well (see
Johnson 1921, Morton-Williams 1960). Why would modern Oyo State, for
instance,
not opt for the stability and wisdom which a second Chamber confers in
the governance
of a people?
Let me offer a
second prime example of over-centralization
that flowed from the era of military rule by discussing the profligate
manner
of creating constituent states of the Federation that has sadly emerged
as part
of our new political culture. The campaign by disadvantaged minority
ethnic
groups for creating more Regions out of the existing three Regions of
the
North, West, and East grew loud and serious in the decolonization
decade of the
1950s (see Arikpo 1967). The fears of the minorities and their demand
for
equity were the principal rationale for the establishment of the
Willink
Commission at the London Constitutional Conference of 1957. The
Commission
canvassed views throughout Nigeria in an exercise that has remained a
major
example of how carefully and how seriously national constitutional
matters
should be weighed. In the end the Willink Commission declined to
recommend the
splitting up of any of the Regions, offering instead other options for
allaying
the fears of the minorities. One principal reason for this outcome was
the
opposition of each of the Regions against losing any portions of its
territory.
These Regions were fearful of losing economic resources at a time when
they had
to rely on their own productive powers for their survival and
prosperity.
However, following Independence and crisis in Western Nigeria, the two
coalition
partners at the Federal Center, namely, Northern Peoples’ Congress
(NPC) and
National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) combined to force through
the
Constitutional steps necessary to create a new Midwest Nigeria out of
the
troubled Western Region. These included legislative approval at the
Federal
Centre and in the legislative assemblies of the affected Western Region
as well
as a referendum in the two Provinces of Benin and Delta that sought
separation
from the Western Region.
The creation of the
new Midwestern Region out
of Western Nigeria did not of course calm down the crisis in the
Region. On the contrary, its
intensification led directly
to the bloody coup d’ etat of January
1966 and eventually to civil war. On the eve of that Civil War between
secessionist
Eastern Nigeria and the rest of the country, General Yakubu Gowon’s
Central
Government took extra-constitutional measures to create a total of
twelve
states in the Federation, thus satisfying the agitation of
disadvantaged
minorities for their own states. It was at this point that the awkward
terminology of Regions, of colonial vintage, was dropped in deference
to its
current term of states. That exercise of states creation carefully
balanced the
interests of Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria, creating six states
in each
of these historically distinct areas.
Yakubu Gowon’s
creation of twelve states in
1967 could be seen as a war-time stroke of preemptive diplomacy that
probably
helped Nigeria to defeat secession. He was cautious not to turn it into
a
popular exercise to be repeated. However, the two men who drove General
Gowon
from office were not so careful. Murtala Muhammed and Olusegun Obasanjo
were in
a hurry in 1975 to create more states. They and the cohort of their
successors
of military dictators have by now created a total of thirty-six states
by
unchallenged acts of military decrees. In these later exercises of
states
creation, economic viability of the states has disappeared as a central
criterion to be wieghed. For instance, some of the states that have
been
created in these waves of states creation are among the least
economically
productive areas of the Sahel region of West Africa. Even so, there are
current
political pressures to split many of Nigeria’s economically unviable
states
into even smaller units. This is because there is no strict requirement
that
Nigeria’s constituent states should be economically viable. It is
enough for
the states to await allocation from the Federation account and the
Central
Government at Abuja to survive. The unwritten formula that equal
numbers of
states should be created for the North and the South in any exercise of
states
creation does mean that states with marginal resources will continue to
emerge
in what appears to be an unending agenda of adding more states by
splitting
existing ones. Not surprisingly, civilian successors to military rulers
seem to
believe that they must create their own share of states, as the ongoing
campaigns for states creation demonstrate. One wonders how many states
will
exist in the Federation in, say, fifty years hence. One wonders,
indeed, if we as
a people bother to look that far ahead into Nigeria’s prospects. This
unending
cycle of states creation is clearly a worrisome development that may
further
cripple Nigeria’s capabilities to participate fully in the unfolding
global economic
expansion of the twenty-first century.
Without doubt, the
over-riding legacy of
military rule in Nigeria is over-centralization of governmental
functions. In
my view, it is a legacy that Nigeria must curb if it has a chance of
competing
in the tough international environment of the twenty-first century.
Military
dictators imposed various schemes of centralized governance in the
apparent
belief that the previous era of multiple structures and functions of
autonomous
governments were cumbersome and inefficient. But obsession with
centralization
of governance, which military rule has bequeathed to us, has resulted
in
failures that are glaring and that have humbled Nigeria. I will pick on
two
instances of over-centralization in order to illustrate the
debilitating consequences
of military rule in the sphere of constitutional development of Nigeria.
First, we must
weigh the damages that local
governments have suffered as a result of over-centralization. In
colonial times
and in pre-Civil War independent Nigeria, local governments were
important arms
of state governments. Local governments, initially called Native
Authorities,
delivered a wide range of services in rural areas. These included
excellent
elementary school education that many young men in rural areas relied
on for
climbing up to working careers and to precious further secondary school
education. Local governments offered such other valuable services as
motorable
roads, medical treatment dispensaries and disease control projects,
including management
of such deadly diseases as leprosy and small-pox. Many rural
communities relied
on these services.
In
urban
areas,
Town
Councils
offered
an
array
of services that city dwellers
relied on. Sanitary inspection, town planning, water supply and markets
and
their managements were among valuable services that Town Councils
provided in
all regions of Nigeria. The personnel of such high profile Town
governments as
Lagos Town Council rivalled that of the Central Government in the
quality of
employees whom they attracted. Thus, such giants in the history of
Nigerian
public service as Dr. Ladipo Oluwole and Chief Adogbeji Salubi were
employees of
Lagos Town Council in the 1930s-1940s.
All of these local
government formations were
judged to be efficient because they raised the revenues from which they
funded
the services that they provided. They did receive subventions from
Regional and
Central Governments, usually for targeted expenditures. But they had to
tax
residents as well as raise tax revenues on the services that they
provided.
Local government treasuries were key aspects of Regional governments
because
they raised funds. They were not without their problems. Theft of funds
was not
uncommon. But these thieves were often convicted in courts of law.
Any fair-minded
historical evaluation of the system
of local governments that was in place before military rule would find
it
difficult to dismiss it as of no value to the ordinary men and women
whom they
served. Yet the sweep of centralization reforms of 1975-1976 ushered
into local
government formations in the country some constitutional changes that
have
dramatically altered their character. Sadly, those changes have had
unintended
consequences that have virtually led to the downfall of the local
government
system in Nigeria. This is so whether we wish to compare the
well-funded local
governments of our times to their ancestors in colonial times and in
the era
before military rule or whether we compare these “modern” Nigerian
local
governments with their international counterparts. In my view, the
downfall of the
system of Nigerian local governments is traceable to inherent flaws of
the
centralization measures that have federalized their legal status and
their
funding.
The 1999
Constitution recognizes 768 local
governments that military rulers, operating from the Central
Government, had
decreed for the states and the Federal Capital Territory at Abuja.
Unlike the
era before military rule, there is no necessary condition requiring
that these
local governments be economically viable or that they be capable of
raising
internal revenues for the presumed services that they are expected to
provide
to their areas of governance. As a matter of fact, these local
governments were
created by military rulers to serve as receptacles of their allotted
share of
the largesse from petroleum oil revenues distributed from the
Federation
Account. Put differently, most of these local governments would
collapse if
they did not receive regular allocations from the Central Government.
The first major
casualty of the federalization
and centralization of local governments under military rule and its
aftermath in
the 1999 Constitution is the loss of the vital distinction between
local
governments in rural areas and those in urban and metropolitan areas of
the
nation. Centralization has created false uniformities of functions for
local
governments (that have been meticulously elaborated in the Fourth
Schedule of
the 1999 Constitution). These functions have been pegged at the
expectations of
rural areas. The larger leadership roles that mayors of international
metropolitan cities now direct in the 21st century have been
reduced
to those functions that Chairmen of rural areas are expected to
provide. Would
it not have been more beneficial for development prospects of the
nation if
Nigeria’s local governments, especially those in the Cities, are
challenged to
provide statements of Charters that spell out their expectations of
functions
and the office holders who would perform those functions? What would be
wrong for
affected States in carving out major metropolitan areas like Lagos,
Kano, Port
Harcourt, Warri and Benin that could compete with their international
counterparts and not thus be limited to comparison with the governance
of rural
areas with less population and fewer problems of governance? It is sad
to see
several cities that had illustrious histories of metropolitan
governance, like
Warri and Jos, now reduced to the status of rural local governments.
Furthermore, there
are major sociological
problems of alienation and corruption that appear to have arisen as a
consequence of the constitutionally mandated funding of the local
governments
from the Federation Account. When, in a previous era before military
rule, Native
Authorities and local government councils raised revenue from local
sources, the
chieftains of these bodies were close to the people. They needed the
support
and approval of the people whom they served for the success of their
duties.
Under military rule and in the post-military era, the chieftains of
local
governments rely heavily on remittances from the Central Government.
Many of
them do not need to raise additional funds from local sources.
Consequently, in
many states of the Federation, there is a growing alienation of the
people from
the chieftains of Local Government Councils. In addition, there is
widespread
corruption because the Councils preside over funds that come from the
Central
Government almost in the form of gifts, sometimes with few strings of
accountability attached to them.
Let me move on to another
area concerning
police and security in which mandated centralization has wreaked havoc
on the
provision of basic security and policing services in every-day life in
Nigeria.
Well up until the onset of military rule in 1966, Nigeria Police Force
had an
illustrious history. Formed from the British West African Frontier
Force in
1898, the Nigeria Police Force was a paramilitary constabulary with
quasi-police functions (see Tamuno 1970). Under colonial rule, the
austere
Nigeria Police Force had a civil companion in neighbourly Native
Authority
Police formations which functioned under the control of local
governments in
the North and West. Or, as a pair of authors reported the matter, "The [Nigerian Police] Force was assisted in the
North
and in the West by local native administration [N.A.] forces of varying
size
and quality ... No such forces existed in the East" (Clayton and
Killingray 1989: 26).
The Nigeria
Police Force became a subject of
fierce controversy during the decolonization decade in Constitutional
conferences that prepared Nigeria for independence from colonial rule.
In the
London Conference of 1957, the three Regions pressed for constitutional
provisions that would allow them to establish their own police forces
in
addition to the federal Nigeria Police Force. This proposition was
opposed by
the minorities in each of the Regions who feared that Regional (that is
State)
Police formations would become instruments of oppression. Consequently,
establishment of Regional or State Police was not allowed in the 1960
and 1963
Constitutions, although the training and control of the Nigeria Police
Force
had regional components that did not therefore leave the Regions bereft
of
policing authorities and functions. Moreover, the Independence
Constitution
allowed the establishment of local government police units by
permitting the
Regional Governments to make “provision
for the maintenance by any native authority or local-government
authority
established for a province or any part of a province of a police force
for
employment within that province” (1960 Constitution: Chapter VII (7)).
In
addition, the 1960 Independence Constitution and the 1963 Republican
Constitution had provisions for establishment of local government
police units
in the Federal Territory of Lagos (1960 Constitution: Chapter VII (6)).
All
these
arrangements
seemed
to
have
helped
the
Nigeria Police Force to maintain
a
reasonable image and to enjoy a decent amount of national and
international
reputation well up to the 1960s. Thus, to help the international
community to
resolve the Congo crisis of the early 1960s, the United Nations
canvassed for
the assistance of the Nigeria Police Force. U Thant, Secretary General
of the
United Nations, made his case before the Security Council of the United
Nations
for the employment of Nigeria Police Force as follows: "The question of
training of the ANC [Congolese National Army] would have lesser
importance if
law and order could be protected in various [Congolese] localities by
the local
police force. Unfortunately, those forces tend to be badly organized.
.... It
is very satisfying, therefore, that the
Nigerian
Government has now undertaken to help the Congolese Government in the
reorganization of the Congolese Police Force, which in the long view is
also
vital for the country." (Cited in Ohaegbunam 1982: 125.) The Nigeria
Police Force was indeed commissioned to train the Congolese Police
Force, a duty
that it performed well -- to the satisfaction of the international
community
and to the pride of Nigerians.
Such
was
the
civilian
Nigeria
Police
Force
that
military rule inherited from the
civil realm that it overthrew in the mid-1960s. Today, after several
decades of
centralization of policing operations in the country, the Nigerian
Police Force
has suffered a major downfall from its lofty erstwhile heights as a
competent
organization. Indeed, domestically in Nigeria and internationally,
Nigeria
Police Force is now universally derided, with great concern and in
total
dismay. Nigeria is now faced with monumental problems of insecurity in
the
everyday life of ordinary and elite Nigerians because Nigeria Police
Force has
become incapable of carrying out its constitutional responsibilities of
supplying basic law and order on behalf the Central Government of
Nigeria.
Under
military
rule,
the
Nigerian
Police
Force
has
become totally centralized. First,
Local Police forces were abolished by the military, ignoring the
relevant
provisions of the 1963 Constitution, following the overthrow of civil
order by
the military putsch of 1966. Second, the military-inspired
constitutions of
1979, 1988, 1995, and 1999 have banned any police formations other than
the
Nigeria Police Force. This prohibition is stated in Article 214 (1) of
the 1999
Constitution as follows: “There shall
be a police force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria
Police
Force, and … no other police force shall be established for the
Federation or
any part thereof.”
This
Constitutional
prohibition
has
the
effect
of
depriving
State Governments and
Local Governments of the authorities to provide basic security for
citizens
under their jurisdiction. The most elementary duty of any government is
the
provision of basic security. It is therefore an irrational prohibition
that can
spun catastrophic failures in governance. The gradual erosion of basic
security
in the country must be blamed on high-handed military concentration of
provision of security in the hands of Nigeria Police Force which has no
presence in most towns and villages of the Federation. Many of those
villages
and towns will be glad to raise funds to establish their own policing
units for
the sake of protecting their lives and properties. It is irresponsible
to deny
them the Constitutional authorities to do so. Nor is it proper to deny
the
constituent States of the Federation proper Constitutional authorities
to raise
police forces of their own to perform their role of protecting the
security of
their citizens. On the international scale of this matter, it is
noteworthy
that some of the most efficient police forces in the modern world are
owned and
operated by local governments of cities. New York Police Department
(NYPD) and
the London Metropolitan Police are first rate police organizations of
international standing that are run by local governments. Why should
Nigeria
constitutionally bar its metropolitan areas from the opportunities of
participating in developments that are the hallmark of the twenty-first
century? Of course, a slimmer Federal Nigeria Police Force has its own
important
share to contribute to the overall security needs of the nation. But it
must
not be overburdened.
Let
me
sum
up
by
returning
to
the
central argument of this lecture. It is that
military
rule has served Nigeria poorly because it relentlessly operated under
an
ideology of centralization of governmental functions, particularly
after the
military putsch of 1975. The most tangible and nagging consequence of
this
mania of centralization is the 1999 Constitution of the Federal
Republic of
Nigeria. In modern times, national constitutions have the dual supreme
purpose
of overcoming historic impediments to progress and of enabling the
countries
for which they are drafted to participate with competence in the
sophisticated
international community of peoples and nations of the twenty-first
century. I
daresay, the 1999 Constitution accomplishes
neither of
these goals.
Nigeria’s
military
leaders
have
misread
the
central
canons
of the nation’s history and
sociology. First, they have treated Nigeria’s cultural diversities as
disabilities
that have to be cured. Second, military rulers have used the instrument
of
centralization of governmental structures and functions as a vehicle
for
overcoming what they saw as inefficiencies that regional diversities
compel. We
all are witnesses to the appalling failures of the 1999 Constitution
for which
the downfall of Nigeria’s local governments and the current disgrace of
the
erstwhile illustrious Nigeria Police Force should serve as forceful
examples.
In my view, Nigeria’s cultural and sociological diversities do supply a
solid
foundation for a genuine federal system in which the productive
energies of
different regions are harnessed together to build up a great nation. A
dispassionate review of the Nigerian Constitution should include a
reversal of
the destructive notion that constituent states of the federation and
their
local governments exist to receive ready-made largesse from the Centre.
A new
Constitution should have the courage to challenge all tiers of
government,
particularly state and local governments, and all agencies of
government to
make contributions to our common wealth and welfare. Otherwise, Nigeria
will be
left farther behind by its competitors in the race for survival and
prosperity in
the twenty-first century and beyond.
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