

A Memorandum:

"Africa: The Next Ten Years" After Independence

*(Presented to British Cabinet by Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
1959)*

SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Printed for the Cabinet. July 1959

C. (59) 109
8th July, 1959

Copy No. **32**

CABINET

AFRICA: THE NEXT TEN YEARS

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Some months ago I asked for a study to be made by officials of probable developments in Africa during the next ten years. The results of this study are now available in the form of the attached report. The problems raised by this study are, to a large extent, already under examination; but I thought that my colleagues might like to have copies of the report for use as background information.

S. L.

*Foreign Office, S.W.1,
2nd July, 1959.*

SECRET

SECRET

AFRICA: THE NEXT TEN YEARS

1. The purpose of this report is to survey the African scene over the next ten years—not in order to make detailed recommendations on individual problems but rather in order to provide a framework within which we can discuss with our friends and allies, particularly the United States, the policy which the West should adopt towards the rapid march of events in the African continent. It is limited to Africa south of the Sahara, since the Mediterranean littoral is a geographically separate area and its problems are rather different; but it can, if necessary, be made the subject of a separate enquiry.

2. The report is divided into five sections:—

- I. A brief historical introduction.
- II. A survey of the influences currently at work in tropical Africa.
- III. A forecast, in general terms, of the probable outcome of these influences during the next ten years, *i.e.*, a rough picture of Africa South of the Sahara in 1970.
- IV. An attempt to define both the interests of the West in Africa and the problems with which the continent confronts the European Powers, particularly the United Kingdom; and to suggest possible means by which the Western position in Africa might be safeguarded during the next ten years.
- V. A conclusion summarising the main considerations which emerge from the survey.

I.—HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

3. Although the outside world had made contact with the coastal areas of Africa from very early days, it was only within the last century that any effective occupation or administration of Africa south of the Sahara by Europeans took place. The history of Africa before the establishment of European influence is largely one of primitive tribes overrun by stronger and better-organised groups from the north and east. The subsequent intermingling of races led to the emergence of peoples broadly described as Negro in the west and Bantu in the east. In West Africa Islam crossed the Sahara and, in an adulterated form, became the basis of a series of extensive native empires such as Ghana, Mali and Songhai, whose influence and trade spread well beyond their territorial limits. In what is now French West Africa there were seats of Arabic learning of international repute such as Timbuktu. There was no comparable tradition in eastern or southern Africa.

4. War was a regular feature of the African scene. The damage caused by wars and raids was greatly magnified when Africa became the victim of large-scale slave-trading. Faced with the threats and bribes of traders, in the east mainly Arabs and in the west Europeans, the tribes nearer the coast found it profitable to raid their neighbours further inland for slaves, ivory and minerals for export. Thus the impact of the outside world acted as a stimulus to the coastal tribes in many parts of Africa but led to ruinous exploitation of the interior. Lord Lugard wrote: "The condition of Africa when Europe entered the continent was deplorable On the east coast Arabs and half-castes were engaged in a lucrative trade in slaves In the west powerful armies of Moslem States depopulated large districts in their raids for slaves. Inter-tribal warfare was an ever-present condition of native life, and extermination and slavery were practised by African tribes upon each other." Nor should it be overlooked that in the centuries immediately preceding European occupation Europeans were the chief buyers of African slaves.

5. Although European traders and explorers had been active on the west coast for several centuries and Portuguese colonisation dates from 1444, the great missionary movement started only just over a century ago in the west and just under a century ago in the east. There followed the period known as The Scramble

SECRET

for Africa, in which European Governments began to interest themselves, many of them with some reluctance, in carving out spheres of interest and securing international recognition of them—although the frontiers were in many cases drawn arbitrarily and without regard to tribal or economic considerations. The first task of the new administrations was to establish law and order and to create conditions which would make trade and economic development possible. Often, and especially in the case of the United Kingdom, European intervention took the form of protectorate treaties made with chiefs. But force was also frequently used, either in establishing authority or in maintaining it. This was especially so in areas where the southward migration of the Bantu peoples collided with the advance of Europeans.

6. Education on Western lines had an especially rapid impact in the West of Africa. This was due partly to the historical reasons described above; partly to the greater virility and adaptability of the Negro and Berber elements as opposed to the Bantu; and partly also to the greater fertility of much of West Africa, which promoted better nutrition and denser population. The same greater virility and enterprise were to be seen in isolated areas of high fertility elsewhere in Africa. Many West Africans tended to look on Europeans as employers and teachers who would help them to advance; whereas in East and Central Africa the Bantu populations frequently came into conflict with European settlers over the areas of relatively fertile land. In general, the areas of European agricultural settlement are those where relations between the races have been least harmonious.

7. Until the second World War it was not normally considered incumbent on a colonial Power to finance development in its colonies from its own metropolitan budget. The major contribution to the economic transformation of Africa was therefore made by private enterprise, which exploited the natural resources of the continent, especially minerals and land, and stimulated trade and commerce. The traditional role of government was first to establish the rule of law and to constitute an efficient administration, where possible making use of indigenous institutions; then to lay the foundations for education, health and other social services; and at the proper moment to introduce the machinery of representative government.

8. In the more naturally fertile areas such as West Africa and Buganda economic development mostly took the form of trade in primary products produced by Africans, such as palm oil, cocoa and cotton; and European enterprise and technical skills were confined to commerce, processing industries, cash crop improvement and mineral exploitation. But in the vast less fertile tracts of Africa the production of wealth from the soil was far more difficult and indigenous economic progress was slow. Only Western skills and capital could wrest wealth from the barren soils; and progress was often further handicapped by poor and uneven rainfall and by pests, such as tsetse fly. Thus in East and Central African territories much of the wealth required to support Government services was produced by external enterprise, skills and capital; and the task of developing the indigenous economy was—and remains—a costly, difficult and protracted one, still only slowly bearing fruit in these less fertile regions. In some areas the conditions are so adverse that little wealth can be generated except from minerals.

9. In the aggregate, however, the contribution of the European occupying Powers to African development during the past 60 years or so has transformed the scene described by Lord Lugard. The administrations have established law and order and have provided education, health services, water supplies, communications, technical and research services of all kinds. Slavery has been abolished; disease, poverty, ignorance and violence have been greatly mitigated; and the African peoples are for the most part free to trade and to raise their standards of living in accordance with their abilities. Moreover, a growing African intelligentsia is emerging, able to meet on equal terms the educated representatives of other continents. Africans administer governments of several countries which have achieved, or are achieving, independence. Indeed, successive governments of metropolitan France have contained at least one African Minister; and these Ministers have filled their posts with distinction. In the political, administrative and judicial spheres democratic processes have been progressively introduced and developed to accord with the diverse local circumstances; local government is being built up, based almost always on indigenous institutions; and the rule of law has been established.

SECRET

3

II.—THE INFLUENCES AT WORK IN AFRICA

10. It is necessary to view the influences at present at work in Africa, both from within and from without, against the general historical background presented above. They are all in some sort consequences of, reactions to, or exploitations of the historical and social evolution of Africa over the last two generations. They may be distinct in origin or purpose: but they all interact and are likely to do so increasingly.

Pan-Africanism

11. There is one simple and recognisable common factor in the political ferment at work in all African territories to-day—namely, the desire on the part of Africans generally to be rid of external European domination and their belief in their right and ability to govern themselves. This "Africanism" (to avoid the term "African nationalism" which, in the absence of any African "nation" in the European sense, can easily be misleading) represents a natural, unco-ordinated up-surge of emotional racialism; and it would be wrong to regard it as the outcome of an organised political "movement." Nevertheless, it is now a major factor in Africa, as a strong motive force which provides the immediate local political objective of educated leaders and a rallying cry to which the great mass of the uneducated may be expected readily to respond.

12. Drawing strength and stimulation from this feeling of common purpose, there is now emerging among African leaders a common political philosophy, based on rather more sophisticated conceptions, to which the term "Pan-Africanism" may be applied. This first saw the light of day at the so-called Pan-African Conference in Manchester in 1945; but since Ghana gained its independence it has shown signs of more vigorous development, particularly in the Conference of independent Governments of Africa (with the exception of South Africa) held in Accra in April 1958 and in the All-African People's Conference also held in Accra in December 1958. Further governmental conferences are likely to be held at fairly frequent intervals. One is scheduled in Addis Ababa next year. In addition, the All-African People's Conference has established a steering committee, which is likely to meet frequently in order to keep under review current developments in Africa. Its Chairman is Mr. Tom Mboya; but it contains also relatively moderate elements, such as the Tunisians.

13. On the 1st May Dr. Nkrumah and Dr. Sekou Toure, the President of Guinea, announced in Conakry the project of a Union of Independent States of Africa, whose main objective will be to assist dependent African States to achieve independence and to widen and consolidate their association in the Union. Membership will be open to all independent African States which are prepared to subscribe to certain principles outlined in the draft constitution. The preamble to the constitution, among other things, condemns "every community based upon a system in which colonised territories are subject to colonising States"; and the principles include a common citizenship, flag, defence policy and Bank of Issue. The degree of sovereignty to be surrendered to the Union will be determined by the member States in common and their economic policies will be co-ordinated through an Economic Council; but each member State will have its own foreign representatives. The Union will not act "in obedience to any one group or *bloc* but will take account of the external forces working for or against them."

14. This is the first attempt to give practical effect to the concept of "Africanism" and of an "African personality" which can play its part as an independent influence in world affairs equivalent to that of European or Asian nations. It may well appear to African eyes as an imaginative and constructive development and will be liable to exert a powerful emotional appeal on the rising generation of African politicians. On the other hand, in present circumstances some African States, whether from jealousy of Ghana or preoccupation with their own problems or preference for other competing conceptions such as that of the French Community, may not be much moved by it. It is not likely, for instance, to have much attraction for M. Houphouet-Boigny in the Ivory Coast or for leading politicians in Nigeria. Moreover, as the experience of the Mali confederation has already illustrated, it will have many difficulties to overcome if it is to be translated into effect. The practical problems of association will be serious enough even as

SECRET

between Ghana and Guinea—the one a member of the sterling area, the other in the franc zone; the one speaking English, the other speaking French and neither sharing a common African language. They will become the more formidable the wider the area over which the Union attempts to extend its influence. In the end the sentiments underlying the British Commonwealth and the French Community may prove to exert as much appeal to African opinion as that of a United States of Africa. Again, while there are obvious cases where existing boundaries separate peoples of the same tribe and speech, there are equally "national," or at least "tribal," patriotisms which may run counter to closer association. Although the eradication of tribalism is a prerequisite to the development of the "modern" Africa which the political leaders wish to see, tribal loyalty still remains a potent force and the problem of adjustment between the tribe and the State will not be easily solved. Indeed, there are signs—which are discussed below under "The Changing Order of Society"—that the prospect of the withdrawal of the colonial Powers and the fear of domination by other political groups has the effect of stimulating "tribal particularism": and this may result in fissiparous tendencies in States which attain independence, unless the central Governments are either strong enough to suppress them or skilful enough to retain tribal adherence by a judicious measure of devolution of power. Alternatively, when independence has been attained there may be pressure in some cases to redraw the frontiers imposed by Europeans in order to make them correspond more closely with tribal boundaries.

15. In the longer term the aspirations of Pan-Africanism could prove to be of advantage to the United Kingdom and the West. The idea of a "Pan-African" personality might develop into a strong, because indigenous, natural defence against the external influences, particularly from the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic, to which African countries will increasingly be exposed. And the emergence of a grouping of African States as an international entity distinct from the "Afro-Asian" *bloc* or the Arab *bloc* might well be to the advantage of the West. Moreover, political and economic collaboration between newly independent States should make for greater order and stability within the continent. On the other hand, in the early removal of colonial rule Pan-Africanism has a more simple and straightforward objective, to which immediate expression can be, and is being, given. The stimulation which current Pan-African activities are giving to this basic impulse is having two effects: first, it is making African politicians still more impatient and intransigent in their approach to local political issues; second, it is tending to cause African thinking to put the emphasis on African domination rather than on "non-racial" or "partnership" solutions. It would be dangerous to under-estimate the effect of this tendency in the immediate future; and so long as problems of political development and European-African relationships persist in the territories where the West remains responsible, the immediate "anti-colonial" objective of Pan-African activities is bound both to make the solution of those problems immeasurably more difficult and greatly to increase the risk that the Africans will seek solutions through violence rather than negotiation. This may not be the purpose of individual African leaders in the Pan-African movement; but it can easily be the effect of their activities, as recent events in Nyasaland have demonstrated.

European Racialism

16. The stresses between Africans and European (and other non-African) immigrants into the continent are inherent in the historical background. They spring from natural fear of economic, cultural and political domination. Africans fear that non-Africans will dominate, exploit and hold them back and, particularly in the areas of European settlement, will deprive them of their land. Non-Africans fear that they will be submerged by Africans and that their standards and identity will be threatened. Africans resent the fact that non-Africans enjoy greater political power than their numbers warrant; while non-Africans are apprehensive that Africans will gain political control to the detriment, above all, of their security. Differences of culture, customs and standards of hygiene inhibit the mixing of races and create social colour bars wherever there are considerable non-African minorities.

17. The deliberate pursuance by South Africa of the policy of "apartheid" (*i.e.*, racial segregation combined with white domination), which makes Africans

SECRET

5

elsewhere particularly sensitive to any supposed threat of suppression and permanent domination by Europeans, has undoubtedly contributed a good deal since the war to the growth of "Africanism" as a potent force to the North. Similarly, this African reaction, together with the emergence of independent African States, such as Ghana, professing a deliberate policy of disseminating "Pan-African" concepts throughout the continent, has produced a counter-reaction in European minds, the effect of which can be seen in recent public criticism in the Central African Federation of the assistance given by the Accra Pan-African Conference in December to subversive African movements within the Federation and in the wilder talk about declarations of "independence" on the part of the Federation. But in East Africa, in the Belgian Congo and, to a lesser extent, in part of the Federation itself the Europeans are becoming reconciled to the idea that there will eventually be African majorities in the Governments and are hoping that, when the Africans gain the predominant political power, they will recognise the permanent value and importance of the non-African communities. In East Africa this hope is already tending to make the non-Africans endeavour to come to terms with African aspirations.

Soviet Penetration

18. The strategic objective of the Soviet Union is to remove Western influence from Africa and ultimately to bring the peoples of the continent within the Communist system. In February 1958, Mr. Khrushchev told the Soviet Communist Party Congress that support of the struggle for African liberation was a principal aim of Soviet policy. In pursuance of this objective the Soviet *bloc* is taking an increasingly direct and positive interest in the continent, marked by a significant intensification in recent years of studies covering all aspects of life and social organisation in Africa—a research effort comparable in scale with that which preceded the irruption of the Soviet Union into the Middle East some years ago.

19. This threat is not—at present—a "Communist" threat, in the sense that the Soviet Government are not pursuing their aims through internal penetration on orthodox Communist lines. Indeed, their very failure to make substantial progress on those lines (there is, for example, no organised Communist Party in any of the British territories in Africa) probably contributed a great deal to the recent reappraisal of their tactical approach which has resulted in a "new look" at Africa. The Soviet theorists have now decided that they must reconcile themselves to a long interim period of "bourgeois nationalism" in the African territories before the "dictatorship of the proletariat" becomes a practical proposition. The course which they have set in the immediate future is, therefore, not to build up Communism from within the African territories but to ingratiate themselves with African "nationalist" movements, in particular by supporting demands for the ending of colonial rule. Their exploitation of "anti-colonialism" and racialism serves both to weaken the Western hold on Africa and to provide a respectable approach to the peoples of Africa behind which the ultimate objectives of extension of the Communist system and world domination can be concealed. This concealment will go to the extent even of leaving local Communist organisations in the lurch if overt Soviet support in this phase might prejudice the establishment of good relations between the Soviet *bloc* and "bourgeois" Nationalist parties.

20. The Soviet Union is now making use of all the conventional techniques of diplomacy, trade, economic assistance and cultural relations in order to become accepted by Africans as a powerful, respectable and sympathetic friend. The Soviet Government will seize every opportunity to establish links with African political movements while at the same time, but more cautiously, preparing for the ultimate penetration and subversion of the African territories. In general, their technique is at present to represent themselves to Africans as an alternative source of economic and technical help and an alternative political sponsor; meanwhile offers of scholarships and goodwill visits to the Soviet Union are the means of indoctrinating African opinion and of forming potential cadres for the ultimate Communist revolution.

21. This Soviet approach, freed to some extent from the old doctrinal inhibitions, is all the more dangerous. Although the West has a long lead over

SECRET

the Soviet Union in Africa in terms of association, friendship and shared effort, the present Soviet tactics of exploiting "anti-colonialism" are directed at its weakest spot, where the Soviet Government, as compared with the Western Powers, can present a façade of disinterested generosity. Moreover, they have the advantage of being remote, unknown and un-involved in Africa. Above all, they are believed to be free of ideas of racial superiority; and we must expect Soviet propaganda and subversion to exploit racial conflicts to the full. This danger is of particular concern to the United Kingdom, since tension between white settlers and black Africans exists only to a limited extent outside the Commonwealth. The Soviet Government will seek to identify all United Kingdom policy with that of the Union of South Africa; and by deliberately increasing the tempo and pressure of political agitation in the still dependent territories they will endeavour to retard the steady advance of the African States towards independence based on stable constitutional government, while increasing their own ability in the later phase to subvert those States by the infiltration of local political movements, their perversion to Communist ends and their final overthrow by a Communist régime. If the Western Governments appear to be reluctant to concede independence to their dependent territories, they may alienate African opinion and turn it towards the Soviet Union; if, on the other hand, they move too fast, they run the risk of leaving large areas of Africa ripe for Communist exploitation.

22. This is not to say that there is no suspicion among Africans themselves of Soviet designs on the continent. Dr. Nkrumah was concerned to ensure that the Soviet representatives at the Accra Conference last December were restricted to "observer" status without the right to vote, and that the Conference did not endorse the forthright demand for the use of violence put forward by some of the delegates and applauded by the Soviet delegation. There is also evidence that the effect of Soviet activity at the Conference was to put some other African representatives on their guard against Communism. Present Ministers in Nigeria, both Federal and Regional, have for some years adopted a forthright anti-Communist line in matters of trade and travel control. But the less sophisticated areas of Africa will be increasingly exposed to the efforts of the Soviet Government to identify themselves with all the different manifestations of "anti-colonialism." A particular example is the establishment of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council and Secretariat in Cairo in 1957. From the start, the Soviet Union has sought to exploit the "Bandoeng" movement; and the Cairo "Solidarity Conference" in 1957 was a typical illustration of this exploitation. It claimed to be a development of the Bandoeng Conference; but it was not supported by any Governments except those of the United Arab Republic and the Soviet *bloc*. It represented a major step by the Soviet Union in establishing a grip on the "Afro-Asian movement" and turning it into an instrument of positive subversion against the West. It was also an attempt to bring "Africanism" under the Bandoeng umbrella, and so to turn what had previously been only "Arab-Asianism" into genuine "Afro-Asianism." The predominant interest of the Cairo Conference was directed southwards. No doubt the inspiration in this move was as much Egyptian as Soviet, since it was equally the object of the United Arab Republic to obtain hegemony of the Afro-Asian movement and to use it for the extension of their influence in Africa south of the Sahara. At that time Afro-Asianism provided a common platform on which both the Soviet and the Egyptian Governments could claim to identify themselves with Nationalist aspirations while leading the movement for their own purposes into an attack on the Western position in Africa. How long this identity of immediate purpose may persist is discussed briefly below: but at least the permanent "Afro-Asian" organisation in Cairo must for the time being be regarded as a thoroughly Communist-penetrated "front" organisation and one of the main vehicles for Soviet activities in southern Africa.

23. Similarly, the Soviet Union have sought from the outset to present the Pan-African Conferences in Accra as being directed to the same purpose as the Bandoeng meeting and the 1957 Cairo Conference: and, together with the United Arab Republic, they have made every effort to associate themselves closely with such Pan-African activities. Whatever suspicion of Soviet motives the Africans themselves may entertain, in Communist eyes "Pan-Africanism" is no more than a typical "nationalist" movement of the kind which the Soviet Government are skilled in penetrating; and it would be too much to hope that they will completely fail to do so.

Islam and the United Arab Republic

24. The influence of Islam in tropical Africa is increasing. Of Africa's population of some 220 million over 80 million are Muslim; and of the ten independent States of Africa six have a predominantly Muslim population. For several reasons Islam has a greater attraction for primitive peoples than Christianity; and it is known to be spreading faster in many of the pagan territories. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether, as a religion, Islam will exert a decisive influence on the course of events in Africa during the next ten years. It is no more a unified political force than Christianity; and all attempts in the past to establish some form of Pan-Islamic movement have always failed. Although the Sudan, the Somali territories and Zanzibar have recognised cultural affinities with the Arab world which largely offset their doctrinal differences, the rest of the African Muslim world is culturally separate. Nor does adherence to Islam necessarily imply acceptance of a politically stable form of government. Indeed, the semi-feudal form of Islam which has hitherto characterised much of West Africa is likely to give place gradually to a less authoritarian conception of the Muslim faith; and this, being more "democratic" and more emotionally unstable, will contain potential dangers to the West. It is the political, rather than the religious, overtones of Islam which may give rise to concern.

25. Thus, Egyptian policy naturally seeks to exploit the common bonds of Islam wherever they exist. But Cairo harbours with equal impartiality political refugees from Mauritania, which is a predominantly Muslim territory, and from the French Cameroons which have only a minority of Muslims. Admittedly, Egyptian policies are more likely to be effective in those areas where Muslims are predominant (and particularly in those areas where they are of Berber rather than Bantu/Negro stock, *e.g.*, Mauritania, Niger and Chad); and the Islamic appeal which Egypt can exert will be reinforced in the case of those peoples whose racial origins have some Arab affinity. (For example, both the Sudanese and the Zanzibar Arabs have an admixture of Arab blood, and the Somalis, although of Hamitic stock, are proud of their tradition of Arab descent.) Nevertheless, the main appeal of Egypt to the African peoples—and therefore the main danger to the West—is likely to derive less from the social and religious doctrines of Islam than from the deliberate support and sympathy, backed by the massive propaganda effort of Cairo Radio, which the Egyptian Government offer to African political movements not merely in Muslim areas but throughout the continent. The immediate purposes of this policy and the immediate effects on the position of the West in Africa are the same as in the case of the Soviet Union. Since the aim of both the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union is ultimate predominance over the emergent countries of Africa, it has always been clear that ultimately the two Governments may well clash. There are now signs that they may run foul of each other even during the first phase of subverting the Western position in the continent: and, so far as use of the "Afro-Asian" concept as a vehicle for this purpose is concerned, both Egyptian attempts to dominate that movement and Russian efforts to exploit it have already met with some reaction from Asian and Arab countries. But, even if the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic were soon to part company (and this is not yet certain) and the "Afro-Asian" organisation in Cairo were to become a rather less effective instrument for either of them, we must assume that the Egyptian, like the Soviet, Government will continue independently their "anti-colonial" activities against the Western position in Africa.

The Changing Order of Society

26. When the European Powers first established their hold on Africa, the majority of the inhabitants lived in closely knit tribal societies of varying size and social complexity, usually based on a subsistence economy. Within these communities the individual's life was regulated by recognised rights and obligations. Little was left to his own initiative and there was little incentive or opportunity for him to raise himself above his fellows. Indeed, he was often bound to share his property with other members of his group and to help them in need. These arrangements provided a system of social security which was well adapted to the conditions which then existed. But the impact of Western education, of a cash economy and of industrialisation (often based on the employment of migrant labour) is progressively changing the old order of things, with the result that many Africans, especially perhaps the more educated, now feel a lack of security and

display a certain psychological instability. The process of change has reached different stages in different parts of Africa; and it is bound to continue. But while the social and economic aspects of the old tribalism are bound to disappear, most Africans still retain instinctively a basic loyalty to their tribe which, in some cases, appears even to be increasing. In British territories this tends to be most marked as the time approaches for British control of the country to come to an end. As the cohesive force of anti-colonialism weakens, the sentiment of tribal unity is reinforced as a protection against the unknown future perils of independence and government by fellow Africans.

27. The focus of the tribe is the traditional chief, who is its embodiment and usually the spokesman of the corporate will of its members. He exerts a personal influence, depending on his own qualities and status; but only in exceptional cases would he express a view on subjects affecting the tribe without first consulting them, usually through the tribal elders. The personal influence of the chief is often enhanced by his religious status, particularly in Muslim areas, such as Northern Nigeria and parts of French West Africa, where the Emirs or Sultans have very great spiritual and temporal authority. At the other extreme, *e.g.*, in Kenya, there are chiefs who derive their position entirely from Government appointment for which there may be no traditional basis. Within this range there is very wide variation in all parts of Africa, depending on history, personalities and policy. In some instances non-traditional chiefs have acquired personal power and influence; in others, traditional chiefs have tended to become little more than Government agents, especially in French Africa. But, whatever the status of chiefs, it is generally true that their influence is a stabilising one.

28. This is particularly true of British territories where policy has been founded on "indirect rule" or rule through native authorities whose inherent powers were formally recognised and developed as instruments of local administration. It is true also of the Belgian Congo. In the early years the power of the chiefs and the system of tribal organisation were seriously disrupted; but more recently the Belgians have moved progressively towards a system rather like the British, and chiefs have found their place in local authorities, have been given judicial powers and have been held responsible for the maintenance of law and order among their people. French policy, on the other hand, has been directed rather to replacing indigenous tribal arrangements at all levels; and administrative units have been deliberately framed without regard to tribal areas in order to counter "tribal particularism." Chiefs have been recognised as having authority (which is very considerable in the case of the more important Muslim chiefs); but they have not been employed for the purposes of local administration except as agents of the central Government.

29. Inevitably there has been friction between the chiefs and the detribalised and "Westernised" class of African from which emerges the African politician and "national" leader. The tribal chief tends to conserve the old communal society of which he is head, while the African politician, although often strongly influenced by tribal ties, seeks to replace the chief in leadership, and on a territory-wide, as opposed to a tribal, scale. Where chiefs are very strong, as in the Emirates of Northern Nigeria or in Buganda, the politicians may be chary, at least in the early stages of their rise to power, of clashing openly with them; equally, the chiefs may come to terms with the political leaders and may themselves assume the dual role of chief and political leader, at any rate for a time. But, while there may be exceptions (for instance, in Buganda), the indications are that, in the end, the politicians win and the chiefs either submit to them, as in the Western Region of Nigeria, in many parts of Ghana and perhaps in Tanganyika, or disappear, as in Guinea.

30. Nevertheless the chiefs will have an important role to play for many years in maintaining stability and law and order in many parts of Africa. As constitutional advance proceeds, they will tend to lose any powers which they may still claim to exercise by inherent right; but they may expect to keep their traditional and ceremonial functions and, if they retain the respect of their people and are able to move with the times, the influence which they derive from those functions is likely to continue. Indeed, they may even find new functions being conferred on them. "What is needed" stated one pronouncement of French policy "is not to re-establish chiefs in the social structure which is dying but to establish them in a modern Africa which is being born."

SECRET

31. Moreover, the issue is not simply one between, on the one hand, "nations" formed by the devolution of European authority within frontiers drawn by Europeans and, on the other hand, individual African tribes. Groups of tribes form linguistic and cultural entities, often of considerable size, which transcend existing administrative boundaries. Some groups have greater awareness of their cultural affinities than others. Conspicuous examples are the Somalis in the East, who aspire to a union of what are now five separate territories; the Bakongo, who are spread round the Lower Congo in French, Belgian and Portuguese territory and whose cultural association has now taken an openly political form; and the Wolofs who are becoming increasingly aware of their cultural entity which stretches across Senegal and the Gambia into Portuguese Guinea. These cultural affinities will be fostered by the growing practice of giving children primary instruction in their native language.

32. Whatever the future of chiefs, therefore, "tribal particularism" is likely to remain a force to be reckoned with throughout Africa for many years. Although in Ghana and Guinea it would seem that "national" loyalty is at the moment submerging tribal loyalty, in most parts of Africa it will be a long time before the latter entirely disappears. This will not necessarily make for disunity. Tribal loyalty may, indeed, come to be a supplement to "national" loyalty and a stabilising factor which will tend to limit authoritarian tendencies in a "national" government. This could well happen in Nigeria.

The Economic Factors

33. The economic significance of Africa lies mainly in the number of raw materials which the continent produces, many of which are essential in the sense that they could not easily be replaced from elsewhere. The most important are gold, uranium, diamonds, manganese, chrome, asbestos, copper and iron ore, which are concentrated mainly in the areas of central and southern Africa which have been settled by Europeans; and sisal, cocoa, palm oil, coffee, cotton, groundnuts and lithium in East or West Africa. Africa produces 50 per cent. or more of the world's supplies of gold, diamonds, sisal, lithium, cocoa and palm oil. On the assumption that the world economy is not violently disturbed during the next ten years by a major war and that the general tendency of demand and production continues to be expansionary, the opportunities for economic development in Africa should be very considerable. The past ten years have seen rapid social and economic development in almost all the territories of the continent; and the newly emerging countries are setting their sights still higher for the next ten years. In particular, the opening up of the oil deposits in the Sahara and elsewhere may mark the beginning of a wholly new era in the life of large parts of Africa, in which profound political and economic changes will be effected by this new source of wealth and power.

34. It has been suggested that an economy is within reach of modernisation and self-sustained growth when it can devote about 15 per cent. of its national income to productive investment. It follows that "to him that hath shall be given." This can be seen happening all over the world; and it is very clear in Africa. In West and Equatorial Africa, where agriculture is the foundation of livelihood and the main source of export income, investment rarely exceeds 12 per cent. of the national income; and the average is probably not much above 8 per cent. But in the southern Congo, the Rhodesias and South Africa, which have grown rich by the white man's exploitation of mineral deposits, investment (much of which has been derived from private lenders overseas) has been equivalent to anything between 20 and 30 per cent. of the national income for the last decade. Conversely, the areas where no large scale white settlement has occurred have seen the most rapid political change, while the white man's preserve in the southern regions of Africa has resisted the political advance of the coloured peoples. As a result the African's prospect of economic improvement tends to vary inversely with his prospect of political improvement; and the highest standard of living for the African to-day is probably to be found in South Africa, where his chances of political advance are nil. It has been well said that "the fate of Africa in the next decade depends upon economic advance catching up with political advance in the "Africanised" north and west, and political reconciliation matching economic growth in the plural societies of the centre, east and south."

SECRET

35. But there are certain obvious limitations to the rate of economic growth in Africa which can safely be assumed; and the attractions which the continent offers to the external investor should not be exaggerated. It is true that, by comparison with Asia, Africa is not subjected to the grinding pressure of over-population and to the problems of disease and starvation which are its concomitants. Indeed, large areas of Africa are under-populated. Nevertheless, regarded as a whole, the continent is not rich in natural resources; the standard of general education is very low; and there is an almost universal shortage of personnel technically competent to deal with economic problems. Moreover, the countries of Asia offer wider and more varied scope for profitable investment; and the African temperament, easy-going and volatile, is not conducive either to the accumulation of local saving or to the attraction of the private investor who thinks in terms of hard-headed and slowly-maturing enterprise rather than of projects promising a glamorous and rapid return. He will be liable to be further discouraged by the doubtful prospect of political stability in Africa; and he may hesitate to contribute substantial quantities of capital to African development unless he can foresee a secure and expanding market for African production. And the uncertainty on this point which is inevitable in the case of a continent so heavily dependent on primary products may be aggravated by changes in the pattern of African trade.

36. The relative importance of trade between the West and Africa has already shown some tendency to decline; and this will probably continue. For example, although the United Kingdom in 1957 still took 47 per cent. of the exports of Commonwealth countries in Africa, those countries took from us only 38 per cent. of all their imports as compared with 48 per cent. in 1950; and this decline may be accentuated when the countries of the Far East, particularly India, Japan, China and Hong Kong, concentrate, as no doubt they will in the next ten years, on developing their exports to East and West Africa, which are very suitable markets for them. Admittedly, the rate of decline in our share of these markets has not been consistent in recent years; and at the moment we are possibly even holding our own. With 38 per cent. of the trade we still have the predominant share. On the other hand, it has been to the industrial markets of Europe and North America that our export trade has expanded most since 1950; and, if we may assume that this tendency will continue, the relative importance of Africa as a market for our goods may well continue to decline. At the same time, standards of consumption in the Soviet Union and its satellites will probably rise and the market for tropical produce behind the Iron Curtain may expand very rapidly. Within ten years, if not five, the present small trade between tropical Africa and the Soviet *bloc* may increase substantially, even though rising industrial output and consumption of raw materials in the West should increase the Western demand for African produce at the same time.

37. This forecast may need to be modified when it is possible to assess more accurately the ultimate effects of the clauses in the Treaty of Rome which "associate" French and Belgian territories in Africa with the European Economic Community. At present these effects are speculative. In the first place it is uncertain how far it may be possible to secure through the G.A.T.T. some mitigation of the effect which this association will have on the trade with the Six of those African territories which are not brought within its scope. Moreover, the common tariff of the European Economic Community on some items of importance to African countries, *e.g.*, tropical timber and vegetable oils, has still to be negotiated. Finally, it is not clear what countries in Africa the principle of "association" will eventually cover. Attached to the Treaty of Rome are "Declarations of Intention" on the part of its signatories, indicating their readiness to negotiate conventions with the independent countries of the franc area, Libya and Somalia; but it is not certain, for example, whether or not Guinea will retain her "association" with the European Economic Community and whether the French Cameroons and Togoland would be granted this status. But, although the exact limits of the area which will eventually be comprised within the association are uncertain, it may well come to include nearly half of the continent, centred round an unbroken stretch of territory from the Mediterranean to the Rhodesian copper belt.

38. Despite all these uncertainties, however, the implications of the present situation are already clear and can be analysed in broad terms. The association

SECRET

11

clauses of the Treaty of Rome do four things. First, they provide over the initial five years in which the Treaty is in force for an investment fund of \$580 millions to be devoted to the development of the associated territories by the Governments of the Six and for negotiations at the end of the five-year period for the extension of such arrangements. Second, they require the Six, over a period of twelve to fifteen years, to eliminate their customs tariffs against goods coming from the associated territories, while their common tariff is being progressively applied during the same period to similar goods from elsewhere, thus creating new preferences in those countries of the Six which have not hitherto had a preferential system. Third, they permit managed market techniques (*i.e.*, non-tariff preferences) to be applied to the "products of the soil," including many tropical agricultural exports. Finally, they provide that in the overseas territories goods coming from the Six will receive equality of tariff and quota treatment.

39. It can be argued that these provisions will not necessarily be to the disadvantage of the West as a whole and that, by stimulating Western investment in Africa, they may strengthen the links, both political and economic, between the continent and the free world. On the other hand the benefits which they may provide will accrue, immediately and obviously, only to certain of the African territories; and the discrimination which is inherent in them may introduce into African politics a new element of discord which cannot be to the ultimate advantage of the Western Powers. In particular, unless the Six accept some mitigation of the tariff provisions, the new preferences which will be created in Europe will be liable to be damaging to territories in Africa outside the association. Some of the Six, *e.g.*, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, have provided important markets for British colonial produce. For example, Nigeria and Sierra Leone sent about 33 per cent. and 40 per cent. respectively of their total exports of cocoa in 1957 to the Six. The equivalent figure for Ghana in 1946 was 47 per cent. Cocoa exports from these territories will henceforward have to face a preference of 9 per cent. at the end of the transitional period of the Treaty of Rome. Similarly, in the case of coffee over half of Kenya's exports are taken by the Six, as are 40 per cent. of Tanganyika's and Sierra Leone's and 20 per cent. of Uganda's. The Treaty of Rome tariff on coffee is 16 per cent. Tea and banana exports from British territories, which are likely in any event to need new markets in coming years, will eventually have to surmount duties of 25 per cent. and 20 per cent. respectively. British colonies and Commonwealth countries producing these commodities have therefore the prospect, at best, of being residual suppliers in markets to which they now have equal access with other parts of Africa; and they may be shut out of these markets entirely.

40. It is an open secret that the association clauses were included in the Treaty of Rome at French insistence and that the French have been the heart of the opposition to attempts to modify the new preferences. French statesmen, who have their own difficulties with the African Governments in the Franco-African Community, try to disarm criticism in two ways. First, they claim credit for the association clauses as an unselfish attempt by the Six to benefit the African peoples and to strengthen the ties between Europe and Africa. At the same time they maintain that the fears which the United Kingdom and other countries have expressed are exaggerated because the African territories of the Common Market cannot satisfy the requirements of the European countries and the products of other African territories will not, therefore, be entirely excluded by the new preferences. The furthest the Six have been prepared to go so far has been to express readiness to consider representations if and when it can be proved that trade has been diverted. But in fact it seems clear that the preferences granted to the African territories of the Six are intended to be of substantial advantage to them; and the other countries have not unnaturally replied that, when the damage is shown by the trade statistics, it may well be too late to repair it.

41. As it affects Africa, therefore, the Treaty of Rome may have a twofold effect. It may increase the flow of European capital for African development, to the general advantage of the West in the longer term. But its commercial provisions will be liable to aggravate the threat to the Western position in the more immediate future, unless they are mitigated to some extent. The Governments of the African countries not within the ambit of the Treaty of Rome are already apprehensive that those provisions will injure their interests; and their resentment

SECRET

against the Six has been heightened by the fact that most of them have themselves always accorded to the Six equality of tariff treatment with other countries (including the United Kingdom) and, in accordance with O.E.E.C. principles, have very substantially liberalised their trade with them. If, as they fear, the tariff changes envisaged by the Treaty of Rome significantly affect the pattern of their trade in the future and the Six show no willingness to take action to mitigate the damage, their indignation may be expected to grow. They are important markets for the manufactured products of the Six; and this fact may enable them to induce the Six to adopt a more reasonable attitude. But their bargaining power will be offset by the counter-pressure of those African territories which have benefited from the operation of the Treaty of Rome. Those territories are bound to cling jealously to the benefits which they will have gained and to seek to resist attempts by others to reduce the measure of their advantage. If, therefore, the African territories outside the Treaty of Rome find that their trade with the Six does suffer significant damage, the outcome may be to make Eastern European markets more important to them; and the rulers of the Soviet *bloc* can be expected to exploit to the full the resultant opportunities both for dividing large parts of Africa from the West and for dividing Africa itself.

III.—THE NEXT TEN YEARS

42. In this section of our report we attempt to forecast the manner in which Africa south of the Sahara may react over the next 10 years to the various influences which we have outlined in Part II. Any attempt to peer into the future is bound to be speculative; and in the case of Africa it is particularly so for a variety of reasons. In the first place the African peoples have little in the way of common history; and they have no significant inheritance of shared culture or religion. In other areas of the world where the Western Powers have transferred sovereignty to the native population—*e.g.*, in India and the Far Eastern territories—the political immaturity of the new society has been to some extent compensated by the fact that the peoples have an indigenous culture of their own, with roots stretching far back into the past. They have inherited a tradition of social organisation, even if they have had little experience of political unity. In most of tropical Africa this element of stability is lacking; and in transferring sovereignty to the local inhabitants the West will in many cases be surrendering power to peoples who are not far removed from primitive savagery. Moreover, the outstanding personalities are few and disproportionately important; and much will depend on what happens to a handful of key men—Dr. Nkrumah in Ghana; Abubakar, the Prime Minister of Nigeria; M. Houphouet-Boigny in the Ivory Coast; and half a dozen more. If these few men were to disappear from the African scene, the whole future of the continent would be affected. It is considerations of this kind which make it particularly difficult to predict with any confidence the future of Africa in 10 years' time.

43. With these reservations, however, we would hazard the following forecast of the political pattern in Africa as it may emerge during the next decade. For convenience we have divided the territories concerned into two main areas—first, the predominantly black area north of the Congo, extending from Senegal in the west to the Somali territories in the east; second, the area south of the Congo which is, and is likely to remain during the next 10 years, an area of multi-racial societies dominated, though to a decreasing extent, by the European element.

(a) North of the Congo

44. Looking 10 years ahead, we believe that we can discern in this area an emerging patchwork of independent or semi-independent States, the principal exceptions being relatively unimportant—Portuguese Guinea, the Spanish Possessions and, possibly, French Somaliland. And even these are likely to be under pressure by 1970. In particular most of the *French African* territories will probably be independent, although they may maintain some form of association with France under Article 88 of the new French Constitution. They may have established some kind of federal link between themselves; and, if so, they will probably have constituted two main federal groups, comprising some (though not all) of the territories of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa respectively. The tendency towards federation is likely to be encouraged by the legacy of French administrative practice, which has established "capitals" at Dakar and Brazzaville,

SECRET

13

and by the fact that the organisation of the native political parties and Trades Unions transcends the frontiers. It would also be more in conformity with natural economic alignments, which are distorted by the present artificial territorial frontiers. But economic forces will not be wholly in favour of federation. Rich territories such as the Ivory Coast and Gaboon dislike sharing their wealth with poorer areas. Moreover, French policy now seems to prefer each Republic to maintain substantial direct links with France rather than to join African federations within the Community. Thus, the Federation of Mali, which was originally intended to include four Republics, has now been reduced to two (Senegal and Soudan)—Dahomey and Upper Volta having yielded to economic and political pressure from the Ivory Coast and to the fear by the Christian ruling class of the two Muslim partners. This episode admirably illustrates the cross-currents of nationalism and sentiment through which Pan-Africanism will have to steer its course.

45. In *Sierra Leone* all the political parties are pledged to independence as their ultimate aim; and in the light of recent developments elsewhere in West Africa, particularly in the French territories, it seems likely that the United Kingdom will be asked, in 1960, to name a date for full independence not later than 1963. Hitherto the Government of Sierra Leone have maintained a fairly non-committal attitude towards Ghana and Guinea; but, if their request for independence is granted, the Colony may enter into some form of association with the neighbouring territories during the decade.

46. *The Gambia* provides one of the more striking examples of territorial anomaly in Africa. The Protectorate is a thin strip of land, no more than 20 miles wide at its maximum breadth, extending for some 180 miles inland on both sides of the river. The result is to hinder the efficient use of the only important river in the area, to make it impossible to develop the only good natural harbour, to create a small enclave of territory which can only with difficulty sustain an economic existence and to maintain an artificial barrier between peoples of the same race. Hitherto, however, the Protectorate has shown a considerable sentiment of loyalty to the United Kingdom; and since from every point of view—social, constitutional and economic—it is a backward and impoverished country, its real interest may lie in maintaining the British connexion for as long as possible. On the other hand, it is wholly surrounded by Senegal; and Senegal is now governed no longer by the French but by Africans themselves. The Prime Minister of Senegal has already spoken in public—albeit in moderate terms—of the possibility of establishing "Senegambia"; and although the economic interests of the two countries do not entirely coincide, we must recognise that some form of closer association between them will become increasingly probable, especially if the Gambia, by joining Senegal, could sell its groundnuts at £30 a ton in the Common Market instead of £20 a ton outside it as at present. In that event the United Kingdom may be confronted with a difficult decision in relation to the important airfield at Yundum.

47. In *Ghana* it seems probable that the present political system will be maintained, a semi-authoritarian control being enforced by a "democratic" party under the leadership of some dominant personality (possibly still Dr. Nkrumah); and that the Government will continue to ensure by increasingly ruthless methods that the Opposition is demoralised and that the tribal chiefs are eliminated, except for ceremonial purposes. Ghana should therefore be capable of maintaining internal political stability, for as far ahead as one can reasonably foresee, by a continuation of the present methods of administration. Her relations with her neighbours, however, will probably involve new forms of association; and the results are not easy to predict. It is unlikely, on balance, that the association of Ghana and Guinea will mature into a federation in the conventional sense; but it may form the basis of a wider and looser grouping of several states with little or no real merging of sovereignty. We are perhaps on surer ground in forecasting that, although Ghana is likely to remain a member of the Commonwealth, she will probably become a Republic at some point in the next five years; and that the forthcoming exchange of formal diplomatic representatives with the Soviet Union will not prevent her from suppressing internal Communist cells as a threat to the régime.

48. By 1965 *Nigeria* will have had five years of independence. Regional patriotism will still remain strong, but with the passage of years the sentiment of Nigerian unity will probably have grown. The Federation will have held together; and the conservative North will probably be playing the major part in the Federal Government, although it may have had to ally itself with the leading party from

SECRET

one of the other Regions. Although authoritarian tendencies may have increased in the Regions, it will probably be necessary to maintain a coalition at the Centre; and this may ensure the continuance there of parliamentary government. There is little or no evidence at present to suggest that Nigeria wishes to become a Republic; and this is unlikely to happen during the first half of the decade. On attaining independence she will have signed a defence agreement with the United Kingdom; and, if we have played our cards well, she will still, in 1965, be a fully co-operative member of the Commonwealth, although much will depend on our policy in East and Central Africa. Preoccupation with her own internal problems may at first reduce her influence outside her own frontiers; but by virtue of her size and position she should be beginning to play a leading part in the affairs of tropical Africa. By 1970 it is conceivable that she may have become a Republic, although—we repeat—there is no present evidence of such an intention. In addition, the aristocratic party may no longer be dominant in the North (and hence in the Federation) but may have had to give way to a more "advanced" party, a development which may affect to some extent Nigeria's attitude to external affairs. But—again if we have played our cards well—she should still be a loyal member of the Commonwealth. Moreover, the country should be wealthier, particularly if oil resources prove to be large. In addition, the sentiment of unity should have grown stronger; and, being less preoccupied with her own problems, Nigeria should be able to exert a greater influence outside her own borders. In any event she is likely, throughout the decade, to be deeply concerned by, and opposed to, the designs of the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic.

49. *Guinea*, which voted overwhelmingly for independence in last year's referendum, found itself cold-shouldered by France as a result; and this gave an opening to the Communist influences which are widespread among the intelligentsia in French West Africa. In consequence Guinea has already become alarmingly involved with the Soviet *bloc* and may well become more so unless greater Western efforts are made to preserve the political and economic balance between East and West. In any case Soviet influence is likely to retain its present foothold, with disturbing effects throughout West Africa. It is not certain how far President Sekou Touré will respond to Ghana's pressure for closer association or whether other States will be drawn into this association. Mali, with which Guinea has common frontiers, language and religion, may well be attracted. The *Cameroons*, which will be independent at the end of this year, will probably reflect considerable Communist influence. Both the political and the economic future of the territory are uncertain; but it seems unlikely to associate itself closely with France. German economic influence, however, is still considerable; and West Germany may prove well fitted for the task of maintaining links between the *Cameroons* and the West. There is a possibility that the *Southern British Cameroons* may vote to join this unstable State; and, even if it does not, there may be difficulties and tension between it and Nigeria. The small trust territory of *Togoland* is also to become an independent State at the end of the year. It is reluctant to join Ghana; and, if some French influence is maintained, it may gradually be drawn into association with Dahomey. But it will not wish to forgo its independent statehood and its vote in the United Nations once it has gained them. *Liberia* is likely to continue its present conservative course, so long as President Tubman's relatively enlightened rule is maintained; and assistance from the United States and other sources will gradually yield a dividend of economic and social advance. President Tubman is anxious to establish friendly relations with Nigeria and ultimately to promote a loose Association of West African States, each retaining its own sovereignty.

50. Further to the east, European influence is also likely to have diminished by 1970 in the Sudan and the Horn of Africa. *The Sudan* has become more aware of its African connexions since it achieved independence. Its future depends essentially on whether the standards of administration can be maintained and the economy can be developed sufficiently rapidly. The future alignment of the Sudan should not be unfavourable to the West, provided that economic assistance can be provided and used in such a way as to diversify Sudanese production. The Sudan, probably under military Governments, will play a fairly important part in African affairs as a genuinely independent country, following a Nationalist and neutralist external policy not unfriendly to the West, but maintaining cordial political and trading relations with the Soviet *bloc*. Relations between the Sudan and Nigeria may become of special importance.

51. *Somalia* will become independent next year; and the *British Somaliland Protectorate* may shortly afterwards be united with it. The new State may seek to join the Commonwealth although this seems, on the whole, unlikely. *Somalia* will inevitably be the dominant partner in the union; and the Somali Youth League will probably establish the familiar African pattern of one-party government. *Somalia* will be strongly Muslim and, at least culturally, pro-Arab; economically unviable; and politically committed to furthering the plan for a Greater *Somalia* which would include French Somaliland, a part of Ethiopia and certain areas in Kenya. Economic realities, however, may force the Somalis to reach an accommodation with Ethiopia, in order to preserve the grazing rights in Ethiopia which are essential to the tribes in the present British Protectorate and are guaranteed to them by treaty.

52. In *Ethiopia* itself the system of strong centralised government re-established by the present Emperor may have weakened if he is no longer alive and in power. But the country is likely to remain comparatively stable; and the dominant Amharas will probably allow the other races, including Muslims, a somewhat greater share of responsibility. Politically, Ethiopia is likely to move increasingly towards neutralism and association with other African States; but she will probably still allow the United Kingdom and United States certain strategic facilities.

(b) South of the Congo

53. In the non-Commonwealth territories the pace of political advance will probably be rapid—particularly in the *Belgian Congo* as a result of the far-reaching plans for constitutional advance which were announced by the Belgian Government in January 1959. Moreover, the territory should be witnessing considerable economic development, partly as a result of its association with the European Common Market. By 1970 the advance towards independence will probably be in full flood and the country will be in the final stages of colonial rule. At the same time it may be the scene of considerable tribal tension and rivalry. *Ruanda-Urundi* is a Belgian Trust Territory which is only in the early stages of political development. Belgium may decide, however, to move rapidly towards concluding her trusteeship; and this would have obvious repercussions elsewhere. In *Angola and Mozambique* the first stirrings of African nationalism will be visible by 1965, and the white population in these territories may have drawn further away from Portugal and closer to South Africa and Rhodesia. By the end of the decade the Portuguese will probably have been forced to realise that they have neither the political nor the economic resources to maintain indefinitely singlehanded control of their African provinces. *Madagascar* will certainly have achieved independence by 1970; but the identity of the group controlling political power is very doubtful—the island may continue to be divided between factions engaged in civil strife or, if a dominant group has established itself, it may well be under Communist control.

54. The form and pace of constitutional advance in much of British East and Central Africa are likely to vary from those typical in other parts of Africa owing to the presence of considerable non-African settled communities on which most of these territories are largely dependent both economically and administratively. Ministers have recently reviewed the position in the territories which comprise *British East Africa*. They have rejected, at one extreme, a policy of rapid withdrawal of British control and, at the other extreme, a diehard policy of "digging in" and refusing to contemplate any possibility that we may relinquish our control in the foreseeable future. They have decided in favour of a "middle of the road" policy, implying that we will continue to promote the constitutional advance of the territories step by step but that we will also seek sufficiently to prolong the period in which the United Kingdom will retain control in vital matters to ensure that the territories will be reasonably equipped to discharge the responsibilities of self-government by the time when they achieve independence. The British East African territories are to a large extent economically interdependent; and constitutional developments in each of them will have a profound effect on the other two. For this reason, if for no other, policy must be directed to promoting constitutional advance at roughly the same pace in all three territories. But although they are all primarily African States, Tanganyika is a Trust Territory, Kenya contains an important non-African settled population (on whom the economy largely depends and to whom we have special obligations) while Uganda, dominated by the powerful Buganda Agreement State, is

comparatively advanced. These differing factors make the policy of approximately equal advance particularly difficult to achieve.

55. In *Uganda*, if the present conflicts persist, on the one hand, between the traditionalists, headed by the Rulers, and the nationalist movements drawn from the young educated elements and, on the other hand, between Buganda and the rest of the Protectorate, it is unlikely that by 1965 full internal responsible self-government will have been reached. But it will probably be attained by 1970. If, however, these conflicting elements come to terms, the United Kingdom may be forced to grant internal self-government rather earlier, although this at present seems unlikely.

56. In *Kenya*, our policy is to build up a viable, non-racial State, in which the interests of all communities will be secure, and to maintain full responsibility until this has been achieved. Our aim is unlikely to be realised by 1970; and on present indications Kenya will lag behind Uganda and Tanganyika in attaining responsible self-government—as is probably inevitable if the legitimate interests of all communities are to be safeguarded.

57. In *Tanganyika* the African nationalist movement is particularly strong and undivided; but the people are educationally backward. Here the main retarding factor will be, for many years, lack of personnel capable of governing with any hope of success. Even so the pressure for advance is likely to result in the territory's being well on the way to responsible government by 1965. By 1970 it will probably have achieved internal self-government but will still rely largely on external economic and administrative help.

58. Thus, if we succeed in holding to our own policy against both internal and external pressures, by 1970 Tanganyika and Uganda will have attained internal self-government and Kenya will be moving in that direction; but, owing to the backwardness of the majority of Africans in all three territories and the multi-racial nature of Kenya in particular, British authority will remain and will still, in the last resort, prevail. If these forecasts are reasonably accurate, the interests of the West should be reasonably secure in East Africa. But the pressures for more rapid advance will be considerable; and great skill and judgment will be required in order to prevent a dangerously rapid advance which can only result in economic and political chaos and throw the door wide open to influences hostile to the West.

59. In *Central Africa* the circumstances are different from those in East Africa; and they present even greater difficulties. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland consists of Southern Rhodesia, a self-governing colony which took its present shape after conquest, with an independent, strong, numerous and rapidly increasing European population; and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which are British Protectorates. The politically vocal part of the European population, unlike the Europeans in East Africa, are anxious for independence from United Kingdom control, although they are intensely loyal to the Commonwealth. The Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, on the other hand, look to the United Kingdom connexion to protect their interests against encroachment by local Europeans—although there is at the same time a rising pressure for universal adult franchise leading to African political control and independence. The Federation was created as a compromise between two different forms of possible association between three territorial units whose economies are uneven but to some extent complementary. The Europeans in Southern Rhodesia and those in Northern Rhodesia wished to amalgamate, with or without Nyasaland, in a "Dominion"; but the Governments of the two Northern Territories preferred a looser type of association which promised economic advantage but did not imply political links. As a result the compromise concept of Federation was evolved; and it was argued in its favour that it would bring economic and political benefits to the area as a whole and that, by promoting the development of multi-racial partnership based on "civilised standards," it would prevent Southern Rhodesia from passing under the control of the Union of South Africa and would avoid a direct clash between a white-dominated Africa south of the Zambesi and a black-dominated Africa to the north.

60. While the Federal experiment is of vital importance to the maintenance of stability in this area, and, indeed, in all Africa, and while it already has considerable economic achievement to its credit, it is bedevilled by African fears of being dominated by local Europeans and by European fears of being submerged by an "uncivilised" African nationalism. It is in order to counter these fears that the United Kingdom has insisted, on the one hand, that, as stated in the

pledges contained in the Preamble to the Constitution and reiterated by United Kingdom Ministers when that Constitution was debated in Parliament, our protection of African interests will be maintained so long as the majority of the people so desire and, on the other hand, has agreed to a high qualification for the franchise, based on a necessarily arbitrary interpretation of "civilised standards."

61. In 1960 a Conference of the Governments concerned is to review the Federal Constitution, to agree on the constitutional advances which may be made and to "consider a programme for the attainment of such a status as would enable the Federation to become eligible for full membership of the Commonwealth." If this Conference succeeds in finding a course which is both acceptable to the Federal Government and compatible with our pledges to the Africans, we may perhaps infer that by 1965 the Europeans will still be providing the main driving force of government in Southern Rhodesia and in the central Federal Government; that the United Kingdom Government will still be in ultimate control of the Governments of the two Northern Territories; but that in Northern Rhodesia Africans will probably be playing an increasingly substantial part in the Legislature as well as participating in the Executive and in Nyasaland will be likely to have a majority of the unofficial members in the Legislature and to be playing a prominent part in the Executive. In the following five years the position should remain reasonably stable, with African influence gradually increasing in the Legislatures and Executives of the Northern Territories and in elections to the Federal and Southern Rhodesian Legislatures but Europeans still providing most of the effective direction in the Federal and Southern Rhodesian Governments.

62. But, if the 1960 Conference fails to find a solution which is both reasonably acceptable to the parties concerned and capable of providing stable and progressive administration, the picture grows darker. For in that event the Federation will be rapidly subjected to an increasing strain which may soon become intolerable. Confidence between the races will deteriorate sharply; there will be a grave risk that the Europeans will adopt increasingly restrictive policies; and in the end they may attempt to force the issue by declaring the Federation, or at least the two Rhodesias, fully independent under predominantly European Governments. The Africans (if they have not already taken the initiative themselves in seeking to disrupt the Federation) will then react no less vigorously in the opposite direction by adopting the more extreme forms of resistance; and the white population will be compelled to resort to force in order to maintain their position—to the discredit of the United Kingdom, to the detriment of the Federation's economy, and to the embarrassment of the policy of moderation which we shall be trying to pursue in East Africa. Alternatively, the Federation may simply break up under the mounting pressure of the internal conflict of opinion; and in that event either Southern Rhodesia may gradually drift into the orbit of the Union of South Africa or some general regrouping of territories may take place on more specifically racial lines. On either assumption the Afrikaner racial policies will then have advanced northwards to the edge of the Zambesi, towards the heart of Central Africa.

63. The policies of the *Union of South Africa* seem unlikely to change for as far ahead as one can see; and the relationship between the Union and the black independent States is likely to continue to be one of increasing bitterness. At the same time economic expansion will probably continue steadily; and the material welfare of the African population may well improve faster in the Union than anywhere else in Africa. As a result the Government of the Union may be able so to develop their economic plans for the native population (through resettlement in native areas, &c.) that the Africans will have both less chance and less desire to rise against their white masters. And, although tension between the black and white communities is almost certain to increase, it is unlikely that the Africans in the Union will be able to rise against the Europeans on a scale with which the latter could not deal (probably by unnecessarily violent means). Under the influence of these pressures the Union will be liable to retreat deeper and deeper into isolationism. By 1970 it may have become a republic and may well have resigned permanently from the United Nations. It may seek to maintain links with the United Kingdom and Portugal as its last remaining friends in the free world; but even though we should hope to retain South Africa within the Commonwealth

during the next decade, it is virtually certain that in 1970 we shall be no more able than we are at present to express any support for the policies of the Union Government in face of the increasingly hostile criticism which they will attract from the rest of the Commonwealth and from world opinion generally.

64. In this context the future of the three High Commission Territories of *Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland* is likely to continue to present a delicate problem. We must expect the Union Government to maintain their pressure for the incorporation of the three territories in the Union; and our reactions to this pressure—particularly in view of our commitment to consult the inhabitants of the territories before taking any such step—will be regarded internationally as a critical test of our sincerity.

Summary

65. The picture which finally emerges is a picture of a continent which, in ten years' time, may—at least as far as Black Africa is concerned—be largely "balkanised," *i.e.*, divided into a large number of nominally independent States, in which the black peoples will have achieved *de facto* control and will have established governments which, though professing to be democratic, will in fact be largely authoritarian in their outlook. But they will not necessarily be any the less stable on this account; and although it would be unrealistic to assume that newly independent African States will be either able or willing to sustain the full burden of responsible representative government as it is known in the Western democracies, their authoritarian régimes will probably command a wide measure of popular support. Nigeria alone may be an exception, in that, although the Regional administrations may well be semi-dictatorships, the central Federal Government (which is likely to constitute the real focus of power and authority) may be established on a basis of parliamentary democracy.

66. The States constituting this patchwork will be likely to be linked more or less loosely together in various forms of federal association or, more probably, in shifting alliances; but it would be unwise to assume that, at least by 1970, they will be integrated into a relatively small number of competent and viable units. There will be a good deal of jealousy and friction between each State and its neighbours, mainly over issues of boundaries and frontiers; and this will be liable to manifest itself in the accumulation of arms and, possibly, a tendency towards military adventures. In Ghana and Guinea the old structure of tribal loyalties will have been largely overthrown; but elsewhere the tribal chiefs, although often in conflict with the new authoritarian politicians, will probably survive and may, indeed, assume a new importance, albeit in a modified and more sophisticated form, as an alternative source of psychological reassurance when European protection is withdrawn.

67. In the areas of Africa settled by Europeans the picture in ten years' time is different. In East, Central and Southern Africa the risk is not, as in Africa north of the Equator, a risk of the "balkanisation" of a large number of self-governing black communities but a risk of conflict between, on the one hand, black majorities and, on the other hand, either dominant white minorities or Colonial Governments seeking to ensure that constitutional advance proceeds in an orderly and moderate manner and that the legitimate interests of minorities are safeguarded. In British East Africa there is perhaps a reasonable chance that, given patience and goodwill on both sides, the problem can be resolved without excessive friction and that by 1970 the three territories may have advanced, by peaceful and constitutional means, significantly nearer to what is almost certainly their ultimate status, *i.e.*, non-racial but mainly African States largely controlled by the African majority. But in South Africa there is no likelihood, so far as can be foreseen at present, that the Union Government will modify their intransigent policy of apartheid within the next decade. The pattern of development in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is therefore critical. It is impossible to predict that pattern; but, if the concept of Federation can be sustained and can be encouraged to take organic root in the three territories with the consent and support of their inhabitants, 1970 may see a primarily multi-racial community interposed, as a shock absorber, between the European-dominated Union at the

SECRET

119

southern extreme of Africa and the predominantly black societies which will be emerging in the central part of the continent. But if, by the end of the decade, the Federation has disintegrated, the racial separatism of the Union will be directly confronting the new black states; while, if it is maintained under white domination by force and without the consent of the African inhabitants, the whole of the Western position in black Africa, even in those territories (such as Nigeria) which are at present well-disposed towards us, will be gravely shaken.

68. But, whatever the course of events, the West will need to remember that the new African States, although deficient in administrative experience and organisational ability, will be proud of their independence and abnormally sensitive to anything which they regard as threatening it or derogating from it. This will largely condition their reactions both towards the cold war (where positive neutrality and non-alignment will be the watchwords of many) and towards offers of economic and financial assistance, on which they will be very heavily dependent. It will also tend to make them less attractive to the foreign investor. And if the battle between the West and the Soviet bloc for Africa will turn mainly on the ability of the democracies to solve the acute racial and constitutional problems in East and Central Africa, its outcome will also depend partly on the extent to which the West is able to provide appropriate economic assistance on terms acceptable to the pride and self-consciousness of inexperienced and newly-awakened peoples.

IV.—PROBLEMS OF POLICY FOR THE WEST IN AFRICA

69. The countries of the West have certain common interests in Africa; and they face certain problems which, although differing in detail from one area to another, present much the same fundamental features. The purpose of this section of our report is to define Western interests in Africa; to outline the problems which confront the West; and to suggest how these problems should be approached.

The Interests of the West in Africa

70. These can be summarised as the maintenance of peace, stability, economic security and goodwill, and the exclusion, so far as possible, of Soviet and other hostile influences. In addition, each of the Western countries most directly concerned with African affairs has particular interests of its own, which can be summarised as follows:—

- (a) *France*.—The special French purpose in Africa is the creation of an amalgam of substantially autonomous territories in the west and centre of the continent, constitutionally and culturally linked to France and providing within a protected system a developing market and sources of economic strength. The French recognise that the existing constitutional links between metropolitan France and the dependent territories, together with the present system of centralised control from Paris over such questions of policy as foreign affairs, finance and justice, may weaken; but they expect nevertheless to be able to keep the area linked economically and culturally with themselves, and thus with the West, and perhaps to attract certain other African territories into their orbit. They also propose to set up a military command for French Africa south of the Sahara, which would establish a close working relationship with United Kingdom and United States commands in the area. But they may be under-estimating the extent to which this attempt to maintain the voluntary co-operation of a substantially Muslim African population will be frustrated by other French purposes in Africa, especially the use of force in Algeria and the staging of nuclear tests in the Sahara.
- (b) *Belgium*.—The Belgians have come to accept the fairly rapid evolution of the Congo into a self-governing African State; and they hope that economic and other links with Belgium can be maintained in the process. If the French and Belgian economies become more closely integrated in the Common Market, the Belgian interest may lie in seeking to associate the Congo with the French African system. Both Powers will have a growing interest in promoting policies towards other parts of Africa which find support among their own self-governing Africans.

SECRET

- (c) *Portugal*.—So long as the present régime in Lisbon endures, the Portuguese Government will conceive their interest as being to maintain for at least the period under review the present dependence of their "Ultramarine Provinces" on Europe and Portugal.
- (d) *The United States*.—Among non-administering Western Powers the most important is the United States, whose interest in Africa is rapidly increasing. Their main concern is political and strategic—*i.e.*, to ensure that, as Africa emerges into independence, it remains associated with the West. While public attitudes may still be somewhat anti-colonial and affected by the negro vote, the United States Government and the leading philanthropic Foundations are becoming increasingly aware of the real problems of Africa and increasingly anxious to co-operate with the United Kingdom. In particular, the International Co-operation Administration, an organ of the United States Government, has shown itself concerned to collaborate with appropriate British bodies in order to accelerate the pace of technical and scientific advance in Africa. The implementation of American policy towards Africa has sometimes suffered from the fact that the local representatives of the United States Government have departed from the policy formulated in Washington; but this difficulty seems to be diminishing as African affairs receive increasing attention at high levels. If we are prepared to co-operate with the Americans, we have an opportunity to guide and to benefit from their growing interest in Africa which is bound to become a major factor in the future of the continent.

The United Kingdom

71. The United Kingdom has particularly close interests in Africa—partly as a result of the special responsibilities imposed on us by history and by our present or past possession of large parts of the continent; and partly for strategic reasons. These interests can be grouped under the following headings:—

- (a) Our share in the general Western interest in the maintenance of peace and political stability in Africa, the exclusion of subversive influences and the encouragement of pro-Western sentiment.
- (b) The maintenance and development of our trade with Africa and the encouragement of British investment.
- (c) The safety and welfare of white settlers and other minorities in present or former British territories. We have a particular responsibility to do everything we reasonably can in order to ensure that peoples of all races who have made their homes in such territories with the encouragement of successive British Governments will be able to live there in security and to contribute to the development and prosperity of their own part of Africa.

72. In addition, we have certain defence requirements in Africa which need to be examined in rather more detail. They derive partly from considerations of internal security and partly from considerations of global strategic policy.

73. It is unlikely that, except in cases of emergency, we shall wish to introduce British troops, solely for purposes of internal security, in African territories after they have achieved internal self-government within the Commonwealth. It is even more improbable that British armed intervention will be either necessary or feasible in former British African territories which have achieved full independence within the Commonwealth, except conceivably at the invitation of the Government concerned if it was threatened or attacked by an aggressive neighbour. On the other hand, so long as a territory remains dependent and our consequent responsibility requires and justifies the use of British troops for the maintenance of internal security, we shall require facilities for the accommodation, training and reinforcement of forces for this purpose. It may become progressively more difficult to insist on our right to use these facilities as the territory in question approaches nearer to independence. But, formally, the responsibility for internal security will remain with the United Kingdom; and, so long as this is so, we shall need to retain the means to discharge that responsibility.

SECRET

21

74. In the wider context of global strategy our current defence policy requires that:—

- (i) In certain circumstances we should be in a position to use armed force in Arabia and the Persian Gulf. This implies, given present logistic possibilities, that we need to maintain in Kenya an element of the Strategic Reserve in order to reinforce the small detachment which we can station in the Persian Gulf; and to retain certain modest but important naval facilities which we at present enjoy at Mombasa. We also need over-flying and staging rights in certain African territories in order to be able to reinforce Kenya and Arabia by a route otherwise than via the air barrier of the Middle East.
- (ii) We should be able to reinforce South-East Asia by air eastabout from this country. This requirement similarly calls for over-flying and staging rights in Africa.

75. During the next ten years the only aircraft so far planned which are likely to be available in quantity will have ranges which require, for rapid reinforcement, the use of Kano (Nigeria) and either Entebbe (Uganda) or Nairobi (Kenya); or, alternatively, if the airfields were developed, either Bathurst (Gambia) or Freetown (Sierra Leone) and Nairobi. Another possible means of reaching East Africa would be by the route Gibraltar, Bathurst, Ascension Island, Southern Rhodesia and Kenya; but this would involve costly engineering work at Ascension Island. There will, however, be a continuing need to retain the existing intermediate staging posts in order to stage medium-range aircraft of all types to Kenya and Aden. The requirement for staging and over-flying rights will not, therefore, change materially during the next ten years.

76. In short, our present defence policy and resources require the presence in Kenya of elements of the Strategic Reserve; staging rights in Nigeria, Gambia (or Sierra Leone) and Kenya; and rights to overfly territories between the staging points.

77. While the ability to station and reinforce troops in Africa for the maintenance of internal security is essential so long as our responsibilities require us, and our authority enables us, to exercise the right of intervention, the requirement deriving from our global strategic policy is a relative one—for two reasons. In the first place, we may find in the long run that, in relation to independent African governments, we are more likely to achieve our primary objectives of goodwill, commercial and economic security and the exclusion of Soviet influence if we refrain from using or demanding certain defence facilities and meet our defence needs by means which do not involve a use of particular African territories. (The practicability of developing these alternatives needs further investigation. They would certainly involve substantial expenditure and would take time to complete; and the decision to develop them would depend on a balance of many conflicting factors.) Second, our defence requirements in Africa, as we have defined them in the context of global strategy, depend on the assumption that it will remain our policy to be able both to apply force in the Arabian Peninsula and to reinforce South-East Asia direct from the United Kingdom or Africa. But it is not certain that these elements of our current policy will remain unchanged; and, if they are modified, our defence requirements in Africa will be correspondingly reduced.

78. Over the next ten years, therefore, we should be able, if we so decide, to maintain a Strategic Reserve in Kenya (part of which may need in any event to be stationed there during this period for internal security purposes) and to secure the requisite staging and overflying rights. But we must expect political pressures to build up increasingly against us, even though in Kenya they may be mitigated to some extent by the economic benefits which the territory should derive from the presence of British troops. Moreover, we may find it expedient to modify our strategic requirements in Africa in the interests of conciliating African opinion and promoting political goodwill in the longer term; and our defence requirements may therefore have to be modified in the light of other more fundamental needs of our future policies in Africa. At the same time our strategic policy as a whole may change; and Africa may become less important in relation to our defence requirements in other parts of the world. We hope, therefore, that the extent of

SECRET

our strategic needs in Africa during the next decade will be examined in greater detail in the light of the considerations in this report. At the same time we must recognise that it may become necessary to apply force in the Arabian Peninsula *before* any alternative to the use of our facilities in Kenya has been developed. In that event we may expect violent criticism from some of the independent African countries, which may have repercussions on internal security in Kenya itself.

The Problems of the West in Africa

79. The impact of European power and civilisation on Africa and the rapid social and economic revolution in the life of the African peoples which has resulted have created acute stresses within the continent and have confronted the West with grave new problems. Basically, these problems are two—first, the pace and timing of the progress of still dependent countries towards self-government in the context of the inter-racial problem; second, the means by which the West should seek to retain the sympathy and support of newly independent States in Africa and to prevent them from being subverted by Soviet influence. These problems need separate discussion.

Constitutional Advance and Racial Tension

80. The colonial policies of the United Kingdom have themselves led the African peoples to believe that independence is the ultimate goal to which they are being directed. And the other European Powers who are involved in Africa are equally tending to grant the Africans an increasing degree of responsibility for the management of their own affairs. But it is essential both to the completion of the task of colonial trusteeship and to the safeguarding of the general interests of the West in Africa for the future that power should not be transferred until there is at least a fairly firm prospect that the territories concerned will remain reasonably stable and viable and will be capable of standing on their own feet. If power were handed over before these conditions were satisfied, internal chaos would develop and the territories would be a prey to the hostile external forces which are now seeking to penetrate the continent. The rising African politicians, however, stimulated by internal and external pressures, naturally desire to achieve independence in their time. In seeking, therefore, to bring the process of "nation-building" in Africa to its logical end, the metropolitan Powers face the dilemma of arousing bitterness and hostility if they appear to be going too slowly: or, if they go too quickly, of failing to fulfil their obligations and jeopardising the future of the territories both for their own inhabitants and for the West generally.

81. This problem has not proved impossible to resolve in West Africa, where there is no substantial settled non-African population and a substantial degree of social and economic progress has already been achieved. All the French West African territories are now wholly self-governing members of the French Community, apart from Guinea, which is independent, and the French Cameroons and Togoland, which are to become independent on the 1st January, 1960. Of the British territories Ghana is independent, Nigeria is on the verge of becoming so, and Sierra Leone has an advanced constitution.

82. But in the British East and Central African territories the problem arises in a more acute form, partly because, for historical and economic reasons, the African peoples in these regions are more "backward" and partly because in the eastern half of Africa the problem of establishing a genuine partnership between Africans and non-Africans in all walks of life and on a workable and equitable basis assumes a particularly acute form. In East Africa there cannot be much doubt that the African majority will ultimately gain political control of the territories. But, although it is important that they should be raised to the economic, educational and administrative levels at which self-government can be sustained, it is also important to safeguard the future of the non-African minorities. These generate much of the wealth of the territories and contribute much of the skill and enterprise which are engaged in them. They play a vital role, therefore, in the prosperity and development of East Africa. Moreover, in Kenya, in view of the economic and political power which they wield at present, any attempt to sacrifice their essential interests might still lead to serious political conflict. We shall only succeed in safeguarding the interests of all parties and ensuring the prosperity of the territories if we can build up "non-racial" States where the non-African minorities will continue to make their important contribution to the general good of all the inhabitants.

SECRET

23

83. The Belgians are faced with a similar problem in the Congo, where white settlement, especially in the copper-belt, has created much of the wealth of the area. Both the Belgian Government and the leading companies seem to be moving to the conclusion that Belgian interests will best be served by fairly rapid moves towards self-government on the principle of "one man one vote," without attempting to achieve over a period a defined basis for partnership. Indeed, Belgian policy now tends to regard the non-alienation of the native majority and their moderate leaders as the only effective safeguard for the future. As this policy is progressively implemented it is bound to have major repercussions in British East Africa, especially in territories where the white minority is less important than in the Congo.

84. Further to the south, in Central Africa, the problem is even more acute—partly because the United Kingdom is not, as in East Africa, in sole control of the whole area and partly because the Federation includes one territory, Southern Rhodesia, where the numerical disparity between Africans and non-Africans is less pronounced. But here also, as in East Africa, the problem is essentially one of securing time for the further "development" of the African people and for the gradual evolution of the right kind of relationships between the African and non-African inhabitants. The handling of the Central African problem is therefore critical for the future interests of the United Kingdom and the West. In this area, sandwiched between Black Africa in the north and European-dominated Africa in the south, the stresses of European and African racialism meet and, as they become increasingly exacerbated, imperil the solutions which we are striving to reach. If the bold and difficult experiment of "partnership" and "federation" fails, Southern Rhodesia may be forced into the orbit of the Union of South Africa while the two northern territories in whole or part may join the African *bloc* in the north. On the other hand, if Federation is maintained by force and without the consent of the African inhabitants, the Western position in black Africa will be seriously weakened.

85. This risk is so grave that we are bound to underline it. It must not be forgotten that, after Nigeria becomes independent in 1960, the period of British leadership of the advance of African colonial territories towards independence will appear to be over; and unless we can solve the problems of East and Central Africa, our past record of benevolent government will be forgotten and it will be the French and perhaps the Belgians who will be regarded by world opinion as the leaders, while we may be classed with the Portuguese as the obstacles to further advance. Moreover, although conditions have hitherto enabled us to adopt an apparently more simple and unambiguous approach to the problems of black West Africa than to those of the multi-racial societies in East and Central Africa, the growth of Pan-Africanism on a continental scale will make it increasingly difficult for us to continue to pursue policies which, to the African mind, seem to differentiate between the two areas. We have emphasised earlier in this report that, given reasonable luck, Nigeria should emerge during the 1960's as the most important power in Black Africa—but that she will watch, with increasingly influential concern, our handling of the racial tension which is steadily building up on the eastern side of the continent. If we fail to solve the problems of East and Central Africa in a manner which will satisfy all reasonable aspirations and will demonstrate that we are not seeking to perpetuate an unqualified white supremacy, we may lose West Africa as well.

The Political Alignment of Africa

86. The second main problem which faces the West is the problem of ensuring that, as the African States achieve independence, they retain an active sympathy with the free world and do not succumb to Soviet penetration. If our forecast of probable political developments in Africa is correct, this purpose may not be easily realised. If, as we have suggested, a large part of Africa resolves into a patchwork of independent States, politically at odds and economically weak, we shall not be able to take for granted either the will or the ability of their Governments to maintain internal stability and to resist external aggression. Moreover, we must assume that they will follow a mainly neutralist policy, which might at best be vaguely benevolent towards the West but at worst would be actively hostile. On the other hand, the West has certain assets—a long connexion with Africa; the European personnel who occupy key positions; the large areas of territory which

SECRET

the Western Powers still control; the fund of goodwill which they have gradually accumulated over many years; and the economic assistance which they provide. How can they use these assets in order to ensure that, without detriment to the welfare of the Africans themselves, the interests of the West in Africa are safeguarded? It is not the purpose of this report to make detailed recommendations on specific issues. But certain general principles of association between Africa and the free world—political, strategic and economic links—suggest themselves.

The Political Link

87. The Western Powers will have done not a little to achieve their purpose if they succeed in solving the complex of racial and constitutional issues which obstruct the road towards independence—if they succeed, that is, in transferring power to African or multi-racial administrations in a manner which does not sacrifice political and economic realities to emotional pressure but also leaves no great legacy of bitterness behind. But even when independence has been attained the new States will be inexperienced and volatile entities, liable to be easily influenced and easily subverted. It should therefore be the purpose of the West to maintain some degree of formal political association between themselves and the independent African Governments. We have suggested, earlier in this report, that there will be a tendency for the new States to come together in various forms of federal grouping or regional alliance, although many practical difficulties will need to be overcome before these links are likely to be very close or, indeed, very permanent. This situation confronts us with another variation of the basic dilemma. From a purely mercenary and short-term point of view it might well be to the advantage of the Western Powers to encourage the centrifugal forces on the ground that they are more likely to secure the defence facilities which they need if they have to deal with a multiplicity of weak and divided States than if they are confronted with a relatively small number of organised and competent confederations, capable of bargaining on level terms. On the other hand, it can hardly be in the ultimate interest of the free world that Africa should disintegrate into a medley of feeble and quarrelsome communities, an easy prey to every kind of subversive intrigue; and there can be little doubt that the Western Governments would be wise to foster the forces making for unity and association wherever they can do so on the basis of a generally pro-Western sentiment.

88. Under the new French Constitution the French Community has come into existence. Each Member State of the Community enjoys almost complete local autonomy and has its own elected Legislature and Council of Government. But control over foreign policy, defence, currency, common economic and financial policy, higher education, the supervision of justice and external and communal communications is reserved to the organs of the Community—*i.e.*, to an Executive Council, composed of the Prime Ministers of France and the Republics and the French Ministers responsible for the reserved subjects, together with a Senate, composed of members chosen from the legislatures of France and the Member States, in which France, with her overseas Departments (Algeria, Sahara, &c.), holds a majority. The effect of these arrangements is to retain in French hands final control over major issues of defence, foreign policy, &c; and there is no question of the metropolitan Government being one among equal partners. For this reason many observers doubt whether the Community can endure for long in its present form; and there is a growing conviction that, if France is to retain her links with her former African colonies, she will be compelled to substitute some arrangement resembling our own conception of the Commonwealth. It is perhaps with some such thought in mind that, while Article 86 of the new Constitution lays down the procedure for a Republic to leave the Community, Article 88 contains the concept of "association" between the French Republic (or the Community) and "States which desire to associate themselves with it in order to develop their civilisation." This could comprise not only States already within the Community but also others, such as Guinea and the French Cameroons, which are now outside it. The Belgians also seem prepared to discuss their ultimate relationship with the Congo in terms of an association between two sovereign independent States linked chiefly by economic ties.

89. If the British territories—Central Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Somaliland, Sierra Leone and the Gambia—were to follow the pattern set by Ghana and Nigeria, they too would all eventually become sovereign

SECRET

25

independent States and members of the Commonwealth. But a development of this nature would create obvious difficulties. Many of the territories concerned would be very small and all would be to some extent immature and hypersensitive. The other members of the Commonwealth might well think twice about admitting all of them as full members of the Commonwealth. Indeed, it is hardly a practicable proposition; and, in any event, other destinies seem likely for Somaliland and, possibly, the Gambia. But an examination is currently in progress of the possibility of devising for smaller colonial territories some new status which, while short of full Commonwealth membership, would satisfy their desire for recognition within the Commonwealth family. Such a status, if it can be devised, might cover the British African territories, apart from the Federation and Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. The Federation, if it holds together, will be a sizeable and viable unit. The same may prove to be true of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, especially if, as we hope, they eventually come together in some degree of association. The Commonwealth is in any event changing, and we may hope that it should be able eventually to accommodate itself to receive this more limited number of new members.

90. It seems, therefore, that for French, Belgian and British territories there is a prospect of some form of association with the former metropolitan Power on the basis of equal political sovereignty. This association would no doubt retain the present economic links—in the case of the French and Belgian territories, a franc currency and access to the Common Market; and, in the case of the British territories, a currency based on sterling and the advantage of Imperial preferences. By different ways all the territories concerned may be converging on a common constitutional destination.

91. At the same time we must recognise the possibility that some form of union of independent African States may emerge, transcending the arbitrary and largely accidental divisions of European linguistic and administrative frontiers. The Ghana-Guinea experiment deserves close attention from this point of view because it proposes itself as a pilot scheme for a Federation open to all African States. In a milder form the same concept is advocated by President Tubman of Liberia. But a development of this nature would not necessarily disrupt the economic and cultural ties on a "Commonwealth" basis which individual States might still wish to retain with the European Powers; and the best hope of that stability in Africa which the West should seek to promote lies in maintaining and strengthening those ties.

The Defence Link

92. It is for consideration whether the European Powers should endeavour to reinforce the political connexion by some form of collective defence organisation between African States which would link the defence of Africa with the defence of the free world generally and would provide a measure of deterrence against external aggression and many forms of subversion. But there are several objections to this concept. It is improbable that, at any rate for some years after independence, the new African States would wish to be parties to collective defence arrangements in association with any of the NATO Powers (although the Nigerian leaders are not at present neutralist and have undertaken to enter into a defence agreement with us). There are also dangers in our encouraging any efforts on the part of African States to associate with each other in this way. In particular, relations with the Union of South Africa and the Central African Federation would be a complicating factor. Moreover, it is possible that the emergence of anything in the nature of an African defence pact might make it more difficult for us to maintain overflying and staging rights in the independent African States. Our attitude towards any moves by African States in this direction would therefore have to be assessed at the time in the light of the risks to our defence interests and the counter-balancing factors.

93. But, whether or not a collective African defence organisation is found to be practicable, it is important that the African States should be encouraged to maintain sufficient local forces for their own security, and should, if necessary be assisted to do so. It is also vital to Western interests that they should be helped to devise their own security intelligence organisations, capable of meeting the

SECRET

threat of subversion, espionage and sabotage inspired by the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic. The links between the metropolitan security authorities and the intelligence organisations in African territories should be used to educate African administrators and to train African intelligence officers in the techniques of security intelligence organisation in order that an association may develop in step with constitutional changes and regional groupings as they emerge. Experience has already shown that professional liaison of this kind can create a degree of trust which cuts across political differences and not only ensures a pooling of security intelligence, which is of mutual value, but also provides the opportunity to guide the local authorities in their task of guarding against Soviet penetration. There are obvious risks in promoting a policy of this kind in partnership with inexperienced peoples; but they are less than the dangers of inaction in the face of the growing threat of hostile subversion.

The Economic Link

94. The economic development of the independent States will call for a considerable degree of practical sympathy and support from the West if Africa is not to be driven to turn to the Soviet Union for advice and assistance. The Africans are ambitious to achieve rapid economic, as well as constitutional, advance; but they lack both the means and the experience to do so unaided. The policy of the West must therefore be realistic as well as generous, taking account of economic limitations no less than of political ambitions. At the same time economic advance must measure up to the conditions of political success; and, if self-government and independence are to be substantial realities, they must be accompanied and reinforced by progressive economic development and rising standards of living. It is impossible to predict the additional capital which Africa will need if these conditions are to be satisfied; and the statistical survey of the continent which is being undertaken by the Economic Commission for Africa, the newly-created agency of the United Nations, is not likely to throw significant light on this problem. But on any reckoning very considerable investment will be needed. This points to an international approach to the problem, designed to ensure that Africa will receive special consideration from the various international agencies such as the International Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the projected International Development Association and the United Nations Special Fund. (The International Bank, for example, has lent much less to Africa in the past than to any other continent.) An approach on these lines could have political as well as economic advantages to the West, particularly in those cases where capital provided through an international agency may be more acceptable to an independent State than bilateral aid. Moreover, international institutions may be better placed to give effective and acceptable advice on development planning than metropolitan Governments, whether individually or in association. The International Bank in particular has now had considerable experience of helping under-developed countries to formulate development plans on sound lines and of ensuring that the supply of capital is related to a realistic assessment of needs and potentialities and that individual projects are accommodated to the pace of economic development as a whole. It can therefore exert considerable influence in inducing under-developed countries to concentrate on a steady expansion of production and dissuading them from schemes on which they may overreach themselves. At the same time it would be unwise to assume that international sources will by themselves provide sufficient funds for African development; and it should therefore be one of the purposes of the United Kingdom to seek to interest the United States, Western Germany and other industrialised countries of the West in the development of Africa and to persuade them to provide capital on a much greater and more widespread scale than hitherto.

95. If capital will be needed for productive investment, it will be required no less urgently for social investment—for education; housing and home ownership (coupled with a review of systems of land tenure); and the other social services. Here again we should seek primarily to promote an international approach to this problem; and we should endeavour to secure the support of the proposed International Development Association for the social, as well as the economic, development of African territories. Education will be particularly important. To the aspiring African it is a matter of overriding concern. To the United Kingdom

SECRET

27

and to other European Governments with interests in Africa (especially the French, who have suggested a greater co-ordination of our policies with theirs in this field) it offers an opportunity of promoting a sense of political responsibility and a means of controlling to some extent the subversion of the young. The dangers of a semi-literate proletariat are well known and well authenticated by experience; and it is as politically dangerous as it is financially extravagant to suppose that education is in itself a panacea for all other social and economic disabilities. But if it is carefully related to the needs of the recipients and properly integrated with other plans for their social and political advancement, it should pay a handsome dividend both in terms of economic betterment and in terms of a lowering of political tension. Education, and particularly the teaching of the English language, is the essential pre-condition of the most efficient use of all the other, more sophisticated, forms of assistance which the West will need to provide to Africa.

96. Technical assistance will, indeed, be required on a scale considerably greater than any which the West has so far envisaged. It is debatable whether Western interests will be best served by making such assistance available on a bilateral basis in each case or under the aegis of some multilateral organisation. There is much to be said in favour of the bilateral approach. It makes for speed and for relative simplicity of administration. It enables each donor country to direct its contribution to those areas of the continent, or to those sectors of an individual economy, in which it has a particular interest. It would obviously be desirable, for example, that Nigeria should look to the United Kingdom for the technical assistance which she will continue to need after attaining independence. (A scheme of this kind is, indeed, already being worked out in collaboration with Nigeria.) Moreover, the United States Government tend to prefer the bilateral technique; and if we are actively to engage their interest in Africa and to encourage them to provide practical support for the African endeavour to achieve economic advance, it might be unwise to seek to dissuade them from using the means of their choice. On the other hand, bilateral assistance might be regarded by some of the recipient countries as perpetuating the appearance of dependence and tutelage; and they might be more disposed to accept assistance if it was offered not by a single Western Power from whose domination they had recently escaped but through some international agency. Moreover, a multilateral approach of this kind, while not necessarily resulting in any significant increase in the aggregate of assistance provided for Africa, might gradually help the donors to distribute their bilateral aid more rationally and equitably among the beneficiaries; and, given that resources for this purpose will inevitably be limited, there might be advantages, both of substance and of presentation, in an organisation which would be seen to spread the butter more systematically over the bread.

97. For this reason it has been suggested that some initiative corresponding to the Colombo Plan in Asia might be launched in Africa. But the circumstances in which the Asian venture was promoted were probably unique; and the analogy would be misleading. Moreover, a "Colombo Plan for Africa" would probably be interpreted by the Africans as implying that the West was prepared to allocate large sums of capital for which the African States could scramble. But the original Colombo Plan has never had a task of allocation of this kind; and although its Bureau has oiled the wheels of the Technical Co-operation Scheme, it has equally had no responsibility for allocating technical assistance, which remains on a bilateral basis.

98. This is not to say, however, that there would be no advantage in the existence of some organisation to foster mutual co-operation between the Western Powers and the independent African States on a footing of equality and partnership. Within such a framework the existing arrangements for the provision of technical assistance on a bilateral basis could continue substantially unchanged; but such assistance would bear the "stamp" of the new organisation in order to indicate that it was part of a comprehensive attempt by the West, in partnership with the new States, to assist them to promote their economic development. The nucleus of such an organisation may possibly be found in the existing Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (C.C.T.A.)—which comprises the main European Powers with territorial interests in Africa; the Union of South Africa; the Federation; and Ghana, Liberia and Guinea—and in the Foundation

SECRET

for Mutual Assistance in Africa (F.A.M.A.) which the Commission has recently established as a centre for arranging technical assistance to the countries of tropical Africa. F.A.M.A. is still a very new creation; and the scale of its activity is very modest. But it could be encouraged and helped to grow, and the recent decision of C.C.T.A. to move its headquarters to Lagos implies that it will be administered henceforward in the African State which is not only the most favourably disposed to the West but is also likely to play a major role in the Africa of the future.

99. If an enterprise of this kind were to succeed, it would need to be launched with due regard to the risks which it might entail and to the susceptibilities of the newly-independent states. In the past they have been suspicious of C.C.T.A. as a "colonial club," and, while these suspicions are diminishing as the black African membership of the Commission increases, this development itself contains certain dangers. The position of Ghana as would-be leader of the Pan-African movement and at the same time a member of C.C.T.A. is an ambivalent one, and the Ghanaian Government may at any time press for the extension of the Commission to include the North African countries. Moreover, the association of the black African countries and South Africa within the Commission is, naturally, not an easy one. Three, or possibly four, more independent countries may join the Commission in 1960 (Nigeria, French Cameroons, Togoland and, possibly, Somalia); and this increase in membership may be regarded as completing the evolution of the Commission into an independent association of African states, albeit one which maintains special links with the West.

100. Nevertheless, this development need not be to our disadvantage. If it is true that it is the willingness of the West to provide economic assistance which will be regarded by the Africans as the touchstone of our sincerity, it must be in our ultimate interest to demonstrate that willingness as convincingly as we can and to be prepared, for this purpose, to work with an organisation which African States have helped to create and will increasingly control. And, while technical assistance outside the United Nations must continue to be based on bilateral agreements, there may be a part, even if a comparatively modest one, for a non-United Nations international organisation to play. Such an organisation would associate the independent African states with the West as equals in a mutual enterprise; and it would avoid any implication that the help and encouragement which we were prepared to provide were being imposed by a superior people for their own profit or were being offered in a spirit of patronage. It might also engage the interest of the United States and other Western Governments, including perhaps Canada and Western Germany, who are likely to be both willing and able to contribute to the development of Africa. Properly presented, a scheme on these lines could be of psychological value in demonstrating the desire of the West to assist Africa on an organised and continuing basis and on terms of equality.

101. The details of such a scheme do not lie within the scope of this report. They would need to be worked out with care; and the scale and nature of the United Kingdom contribution would need to be determined in relation to the considerable assistance which we are already providing to those territories where we retain direct responsibility and are likely to continue to wish to provide even after they have attained independence. Moreover, the venture would serve—at least initially—only a supplementary purpose as an addition to the main stream of bilateral assistance; and it would be foolishly optimistic to overrate its immediate practical effect. The relationship of Member Governments with C.C.T.A. will probably remain a loose one, and neither the Commission nor F.A.M.A. is likely to develop into a strong organisation for some time. But, subject to these reservations and to a more detailed examination of its implications, a scheme of this nature, providing for bilateral assistance to the African States under the aegis of an international organisation which might well be built gradually on the foundations of the existing F.A.M.A., could provide the opportunity for a useful gesture of practical and co-operative assistance by the West to Africa.

V.—CONCLUSION

102. The purpose of this report has been to survey the forces at work in Africa, to attempt to predict their outcome in terms of the African scene in 1970,

SECRET

29

to indicate the problems in Africa with which the free world will be confronted by these developments during the next ten years and to suggest certain basic principles by which Western policy should be guided during this period. We have not sought to solve individual problems; we have attempted only to set them in perspective. So considered, they appear as a series of dilemmas. It may be helpful to restate the more important of these as briefly as possible:—

- (a) *Racial Relations and Constitutional Development.*—The pace of the advance towards independence has become rapid in much of Africa. France has granted all her colonies internal self-government, with the right, at least in theory, to opt for independence at any time; and the Belgian Congo is likely to reach the same position in a short period. We ourselves have moved even faster in West Africa. But in the east and south the position is different. If, on the one hand, we retreat there too rapidly before the rising tide of Pan-Africanism, we shall run the risk of transferring power to local Governments before they are competent to exercise authority or to maintain stable and viable administration. We shall expose volatile and unsophisticated peoples to the insidious dangers of Communist penetration. And we shall jeopardise European interests and investments, which have made the major contribution to the development of large parts of Africa and can claim the main credit for the gradual improvement in the African standard of living. This danger is particularly acute for the United Kingdom in relation to East Africa. If, on the other hand, we are too intransigent in opposing African aspirations or, where European minorities are dominant, are too ready to appease them, we run the risk of being identified with the extreme racial doctrines of the Union of South Africa, of exacerbating African hostility towards the European and of provoking the African States, when they finally achieve independence—as in the end they must—to turn more readily towards the Soviet Union. This danger arises with particular urgency for the United Kingdom in relation to Central Africa. The West must therefore seek to steer a middle course between these extremes, bearing well in mind that, while the Soviet Union will be alert to seize every opportunity to exploit our dilemma, Pan-Africanism in itself is not necessarily a force which we need regard with fear and suspicion. On the contrary, if we can avoid alienating it and can guide it on lines generally sympathetic to the free world, it may well prove in the longer term a strong, indigenous barrier to the penetration of Africa by the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic.
- (b) *The Strategic Interests of the West in Africa.*—In the short term it may appear to be essential in the interests of the West, and particularly the United Kingdom, to demand the retention of defence facilities in Africa as a condition of conceding independence. But in the longer term we may well gain, rather than lose, the sympathy and support of newly independent States if we are able to refrain from seeking to acquire, retain or use facilities which appear to be necessary from a purely strategic point of view. On each occasion the West will have to choose; and the difficulty of the choice for the United Kingdom lends additional urgency to the need for a re-examination of our global strategy in an attempt to determine whether we can devise some alternative defence policy which will provide adequate protection for our world-wide interests but will make us less dependent on the good will of African States which are likely to be predominantly neutralist in sentiment.
- (c) *The Economic Development of Africa.*—If Africa is to remain loyal to the Western cause, its economic interests must coincide with, and reinforce, its political sympathies; and one of the major problems of the relationship between the West and Africa will be to ensure an adequate flow of economic assistance, and particularly capital, through various channels to the newly emerging States. On any reckoning the amounts required will be considerable; and, if the Western Powers are unreasonably insensitive to the economic aspirations of independent Africa, the Governments of the new States may be compelled to turn to the Soviet Union for the assistance which they will certainly need.

SECRET

SECRET

In the longer term the European Common Market may increase the flow of European capital for African development. But the commercial provisions of the Treaty of Rome, particularly the new preferential arrangements which it envisages, will be liable to work to the more immediate disadvantage of those States (particularly British colonial territories) which are debarred from entry into the Common Market. Here again the Western Governments will have to choose. If they attach sufficient importance to avoiding African disunity, they will need to negotiate some modification of the Treaty of Rome in order to mitigate its commercial effects. On the other hand, if the Six refuse any mitigation of the serious disadvantages for some African territories which may result from a changed pattern of trade, a dangerous new divisive element will have been introduced into the continent.

103. Each of these problems needs further detailed consideration. Moreover, they are all inter-related not only in terms of their impact on Africa itself but also in terms of their effect on the metropolitan Powers involved. Neither the United Kingdom nor any other administering Power in Africa can consider its policy towards African territories in the light of the issues arising in those territories alone; and the Western Governments must seek to strike a balance between their particular interests and obligations in individual territories and their more general interests and responsibilities both in other parts of Africa and in the world at large. For the United Kingdom it is especially important to harmonise our policies towards the emergent countries of Africa with the policies which are prescribed by our relations with other colonial Powers in Africa. Until about 1957 the former factor hardly arose; and after 1965-70 the latter should largely have ceased to be relevant. But at the moment we are compelled to take both factors into account; and the problem is aggravated by the fact that the position and influence of the United Kingdom in the world depend to a large extent on what other countries think of us. Their reactions are liable to be brought into particularly sharp focus at the United Nations; and we can never afford to forget, for example, that Tanganyika, (like Ruanda-Urundi in the neighbouring Belgian Congo) is a Trust territory, whose welfare is in some sense the special concern of the United Nations and provides our enemies in that Organisation with an opportunity to indict our African policies before world opinion.

104. For this reason there is much to be said for our entering into more systematic and continuous discussion of African problems with our friends and Allies than has hitherto been customary. Various members of the Commonwealth are now displaying considerable interest in Africa; and this provides us with a valuable opportunity to secure a wider hearing for some of the problems which have been discussed in this report. In addition, we are already in touch with the United States about various aspects of African affairs. The most important current discussions cover scientific and cultural co-operation; but a few months ago the Foreign Secretary agreed with Mr. Dulles that, when both Governments were ready, we should embark on a more general exchange of views with the Americans about future developments in Africa. The French also have for some time been pressing for general discussions about Africa, with the particular purpose of securing a greater co-ordination of our policies. While it would be necessary to avoid committing ourselves as much as the French appear to wish, Ministers have agreed in principle that more regular meetings should take place between representatives of the two countries, both at the Ministerial and at the official level; and a French representative is to arrive in London early in June to prepare the way for formal discussions. The French are likely to attach particular importance to discussing education, economic development and strategic requirements as well as the general shape of political development. The Belgians have not so far shown the same desire to exchange views, although they have recently responded favourably to a suggestion on these lines. But the French appear to have developed closer relations with the Belgians than we have; and after independence the Belgian Congo will be liable to become more intimately linked with the French territories not only by the community of language but also by the shared benefits of membership of the Common Market. The French have suggested that the exchanges between themselves and the United Kingdom should be extended to Belgium, and perhaps to Portugal, in due course; and there might be advantage in an enlargement of the discussions at the appropriate time.

SECRET

105. If, therefore, this report is approved by Ministers, it might perhaps provide the basis for further discussions with the other Western Powers in an attempt to ensure that the Governments of the West are broadly in agreement in their diagnosis of the problems of Africa and in their attitude towards those problems. But once this is clear it will be possible—and very desirable—to consider in more detail how the Western Powers can contribute towards meeting the needs of the continent in such a way as to enlist African sympathy on the side of the free world. We have indicated, in Part IV, various means by which we might seek to achieve this objective—by maintaining political and constitutional links with newly independent African States within the framework of such associations as the British Commonwealth and the French Community; by encouraging them to maintain sufficient forces to ensure their internal security and to organise themselves to resist subversion by hostile influences; by promoting social progress—particularly in education and the teaching of the English language—concurrently with constitutional advance; and, above all, by seeking to ensure, primarily through appropriate international agencies, that the new States receive from the West financial and technical assistance on a sufficiently generous and imaginative scale to enable us to hope that their constitutional progress will rest upon a secure and stable foundation of economic development and will be accompanied by the prospect of a higher standard of living. Each of these possibilities needs more detailed examination; and it should be our objective to explore them, in concert with our friends and allies and with other Members of the Commonwealth, as rapidly as we can. The problems are many and complex; and the urgency is great.

106. It is seldom profitable to attempt to peer very far into the future. And we do not claim that the forecasts contained in this report are any exception to the rule that expectations are often belied by events. Nor do we claim that there is anything novel in the policy proposals which we have made. The novelty lies rather in the situation which those proposals are designed to meet—in the unprecedented pace of political adjustment in Africa. It is impossible to carry out even a superficial survey of the continent without being impressed by two considerations—first, the long lead over the Soviet Union which the West at present enjoys in Africa after a century of association; second, the rapidity with which the African scene is changing under the impact of new political and social pressures. The former is an asset to the free world in the twentieth century version of The Scramble for Africa; the latter need not be a liability if the Western Powers are willing to present a common front to the problems of Africa and to approach them with patience, imagination and courage.

May, 1959.